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FOREWORD
It is my pleasure to present the edited transcript of the California
Transportation Security Summits which were co-sponsored by the Mineta
Transportation Institute, the California Department of Transportation, the
United States Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs
Administration, the San Francisco Bay Area Metropolitan Transportation
Commission, and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. Held on March
28 and 29, 2002, the summits featured numerous regionally and nationallyrecognized experts on surface transportation security measures and disaster
response and were attended by transportation and security officials from
throughout California.
Identical programs were presented in Oakland and Los Angeles to encourage
statewide participation by leaders in the surface transportation industry.
For MTI to become involved in these conferences is a natural. We have been at
the forefront of research on surface transportation security issues since 1995,
having conducted two national security symposia and three in-depth research
reports examining surface transportation terrorism on a global scale.
Additionally, we are fortunate to have Brian Michael Jenkins, a worldrenowned expert on counter-terrorism measures, as a researcher and author of
several publications. His previous work for MTI includes Protecting Surface
Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Activities, and Protecting
Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime:
Continuing Research on Best Security Practices. Jenkins has also presented at
numerous symposia and conferences, including the National Transportation
Security Summit, which was held in Washington, D.C. in the fall of 2001.
Jenkins and his team presented their latest research both days of the summit.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the following introducers,
speakers, and panelists who participated in the event:
•

John Allison, Division Chief, New Technology and Research, Caltrans

•

Dr. Sherrie Anderson, Program Manager, U.S. Department of Treasury,
Office of Intelligence and Security

•

John Catoe, Deputy CEO, MTA

•

Sandy Covall-Alves, Emergency Services Coordinator, Sonoma County/
Operational Area Emergency Services
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•

Mortimer L. Downey, former U.S. DOT Deputy Secretary; pbConsult,
Parsons Brinckerhoff and Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC)

•

Ellen Engleman, Administrator, U.S. DOT, Research and Special Programs
Administration

•

Steve Heminger, Executive Director, MTC

•

Nancy Houston, former DOT Assistant Secretary of District Operations,
Senior Associate, Booz Allen Hamilton

•

Greg Hull, Director of Operations Security and Safety, American Public
Transportation Association (APTA)

•

Randy Iwasaki, District 4 Director, Caltrans

•

Thom Niesen, Acting Deputy Director for Maintenance and Operations,
Caltrans

•

Bob Sassaman, District 7 Director, Caltrans

•

Roger Snoble, Chief Executive Officer, MTA

•

Steve Vaughn, Assistant Chief, Intelligence and Security, California
Highway Patrol

Special thanks are due MTI’s counter-terrorism research team: Brian Michael
Jenkins; Dr. Frances Edwards-Winslow, Director of Emergency Services, San
Jose, CA.; and Dr. Larry Gerston, SJSU.
The transcript of the presentations has been edited for sensitive security issues.
It will still be of benefit to surface transportation officials and organizations
who wish to begin a dialogue toward updating their security measures in the
wake of the September 11th tragedy.

Rod Diridon
Executive Director
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OVERVIEW OF TRANSPORTATION SUMMIT
Purpose
The purpose of the March 2002 California Transportation Security Summits
was to provide members of the transportation community from Northern and
Southern California with current, reliable information on the terrorist threat
and how America’s surface transportation systems can effectively respond to
this threat.
Rationale
In the aftermath of September 11, it became undeniably clear that terrorists
target civil transport systems and are willing to use transport systems as
weapons of mass destruction as well as targets. In response to this threat,
America’s transportation community must adopt more effective measures to
insure the safety of the millions of passengers and employees who use or work
in transit facilities every day. To meet this heightened responsibility, leaders of
the transportation community need high-quality information and appropriate
policy guidance.
Approach
To help meet this need, the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI)—a leader in
transportation terrorism research since the mid-1990s—invited California
transportation officials to regional summits on surface transportation security
during the spring of 2002. Participants were able to interact with some of the
nation’s foremost experts on the terrorist threat to transportation, asking them
the vital questions that local officials need to ask as they prepare for an
uncertain future. This innovative local summit was modeled on MTI’s
successful national summit on transportation security, held in Washington,
D.C. just six weeks after 9/11.
Sponsors
•

California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)

•

United States Department of Transportation, Research and Special
Programs Administration (RSPA)

Mineta Transportation Institute
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•

Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC)—Northern California
session (Oakland)

•

Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA)—Southern California
session (Los Angeles)

•

Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI)

SUMMARY OF PRESENTATIONS
The summits in Oakland and Los Angeles consisted of eight panel
presentations, each presented twice—once in Oakland and once in Los
Angeles, plus the keynote address by RSPA Administrator Ellen Engleman,
also presented twice. Transcripts of both days’ presentations, edited for
sensitive material, are available on MTI’s website. However, the following
precis consolidate the dual presentations on the same subject into a single
summary. While each precis follows the approximate order of the original
presentations, the material has sometimes been rearranged and subtitles added
for clarity. Technical terms and concepts have also been rephrased (and
sometimes expanded) as an additional aid to the reader. The Q & A sessions
following each panel are also summarized.

Mineta Transportation Institute
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WELCOMING REMARKS, OAKLAND, MARCH 281
Participants to the Oakland summit session were welcomed by:
•

Rod Diridon, Executive Director of the Mineta Transportation Institute
(MTI)

•

Steve Heminger, Executive Director of the San Francisco Bay Area
Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC)

•

Randy Iwasaki, District 4 Director, Caltrans

•

Thom Niesen, Acting Deputy Director for Maintenance and Operations for
the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)

Rod Diridon acknowledged MTC staff members Steve Heminger, Ann Flemer,
Betty Cecchini and Nancy Okasaki for arranging the meeting rooms at the
Metropolitan Transportation Center and MTI staff members Amy Yan and
Rosemary Barnes for preparing the presenter resumes and handout material
distributed to participants.
Handout Material
Diridon requested participants to complete the topmost item in the handout
material, a research survey for John Allison (Division Chief, New Technology
Research, Caltrans) seeking participant ideas for future research on surface
transportation security and emergency response. Thom Niesen promised
confidentiality to all respondents, underscoring the importance of this survey
to the future of transportation security, indicating that the results would be used
not only by California, but by the American Association of State
Transportation Officials’ (AASHTO) transportation security research
committee.
Other handout material included:
•

Background material on MTI and its programs (including the latest
newsletter featuring MTI Board of Trustees member Celia Kupersmith—
who is also Executive Director of the Golden Gate Bridge and

1

Not a verbatim transcript. Housekeeping arrangements, sensitive security information and
biographical material appearing elsewhere in this report have also been deleted.
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Transportation Highway District and Chair-elect of the American Public
Transit Association).
•

Summary (with sensitive material deleted) of MTI’s October 30, 2001
National Transportation Security Summit in Washington, D.C. The summit
was conducted for the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT),
American Public Transportation Association (APTA), and AASHTO.

•

Overview of 9 vulnerability assessments and 11 case studies of terrorist
actions directed against surface transportation targets around the world.

•

MTI’s chronology of every known terrorist action directed against surface
transportation targets since the 1920s.

Managing Sensitive Information Regarding Terrorism
Diridon announced that, while this was technically a public meeting (and that
therefore no one could be legally stopped at the doorway), everyone present at
the summit had been positively identified as pre-registered. The media had
intentionally not been invited. Those members of the media who had,
nonetheless, found out about the summit had been persuaded not to attend in
order to protect a supervening public interest—free discussion of
transportation security issues by the nation’s pre-eminent experts.
Based on the trustworthiness of the audience, Diridon announced that MTI
would share sensitive information not included in the written handouts. He
urged participants to discuss this information and transportation security issues
frankly, confident that they could do so without risking wide dissemination of
threats and concerns that might unduly alarm the general public or disclosing
potentially dangerous new ideas to terrorists.
Diridon reminded participants that the official transcript of the summit would
be carefully edited to remove sensitive information of potential value to
terrorists or the public interest. He enjoined those taking notes to do so in such
a way that they could not be used for destructive ends if they fell into the
wrong hands.
Thom Niesen thanked MTI for its prompt response to September 11 by holding
a National Transportation Security Summit on October 30, and he
acknowledged MTC and U.S. DOT for co-sponsoring this Oakland Summit.
He also acknowledged Caltrans Director Jeff Morales, who—inspired by
MTI’s support of the October 30 Summit—“worked so hard to encourage MTI

Mineta Transportation Institute
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to arrange similar convocations in Oakland today and Southern California
tomorrow.”
Niesen urged participants to recall how September 11 and earlier terrorist
incidents had changed the way business interacted with the transportation
community over the past 6-10 years. “In what ways is our interaction and
involvement with the police, investigation and intelligence forces and our
businesses really different from the way we operated in the past?” To illustrate
his point, Niesen cited the increasing use of building passes by workers in
many industries, predicting a similar use of identification techniques for access
to transportation in the future.
Niesen underscored Caltrans’ financial commitment to transportation
security—$25 million in security-focused infrastructure investment within the
past 6 months (not counting staff time and administrative overhead); these
funds were allocated to actual hardware designed to improve transportation
security in California. Niesen also emphasized the strategic shift in top-level
transportation goals for California, citing the transportation security motivation
behind a heightened focus on motorists’ safety and system reliability. In
Niesen’s view, this shift represents a commitment to enhancing transportation
user’s safety, “regardless of what mode of transportation they chose to use.”
Randy Iwasaki emphasized the new threat environment created by September
11, which he summarized by quoting a published report,2 stating:
The United States transportation system was designed to serve an open
society in a market economy. The emphasis is on efficiency, speed and
reliability. The features that tie transportation to the way of life in the U.S.,
however, also make the system vulnerable to attack.
As he put it, “In California we’re used to dealing with a lot incidents—
earthquakes, fires, floods and, in the Bay Area, we have a lot of bomb threats
to the two bridges.” He noted that his own office had previously had a specific
plan—the Delta Plan—to deal with bomb threats to the Golden Gate or Bay
Bridge. But when Jeff Morales called on September 11 to ask, “What are you
doing in the Bay Area?”, Iwasaki had no specific plan on hand to deal with the
reported threat that one of the hijacked planes was on its way to San Francisco.

2

AASHTO Surface Transportation Security Report
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Iwasaki reported that his post-September 11 response to this new threat
included a heightened concern about transportation tunnels.
We built these facilities over the last 100 years. How do we close down
everything from a terrorist attack, yet allow public access? How can we use
innovative technology like ITS (Intelligent Transportation Systems) to
provide better prevention and response to terrorism? We’re talking about
the IT world—computers, loops, cameras—and how to integrate all of this
data into an integrated monitoring system.
Iwasaki speculated that the IT monitoring system of the future could notify
managers “when there is a parked car out there that shouldn’t be there—or a
pedestrian where there shouldn’t be a pedestrian.”
Iwasaki was also concerned with protecting transportation structures that
might be terrorist targets because they were landmarks, particularly in the Bay
Area and emphasized steps that had been taken to improve coordination.
We’re partnering with partners we never had before. I didn’t know who the
FBI person was from San Francisco. Now I do. We are working closer with
the California Highway Patrol (CHP) and the National Guard. We are
involved in Governor Davis’ State Strategic Committee on Terrorism…we
all need to work together with the intelligence agencies and law
enforcement communities. We need to be clear about our roles and
responsibilities, so that we are not duplicating efforts. We need to work as a
team. And we need to share information between organizations about what
we are doing. MTI has assembled a panel of experts to help us address
some of these issues, and I am grateful about that.
Steve Heminger added MTC’s welcome to MTC’s Metro Center, thanking Rod
Diridon and MTI for sponsoring this event and for the high quality of MTI’s
research. Noting that most previous attacks on public transportation had
occurred on foreign soil, Heminger expressed particular surprise with MTI’s
finding that there had been as many as 850 such attacks on transportation
facilities since 1970.
Heminger felt that the foundation for the Bay Area’s response to potential
terrorist attacks on transportation should be the existing base of earthquake
planning, including the Trans-Response Plan and its annual exercises. He cited
MTI’s research and “lessons learned” in New York City and Washington
demonstrating that advance training and practice drills had been a major factor
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in minimizing casualties and damage to transportation on 9/11. Heminger cited
the oft-quoted anecdote (“How do you get to Carnegie Hall? Practice, practice,
practice!”), pointing out that you need to know the name of the person from the
FBI that you have to deal with during a transportation terrorist attack
beforehand—and that you need to practice your emergency response.
I hope, at the very least, that what these events have done … is to motivate
us to rededicate ourselves to the training and practice we’ve been doing in
earthquake planning—and to add the terrorist threat and other kinds of
threats to our transportation infrastructure to that training. We need to learn
all we can today about these new threats that, unfortunately, we are going
to have to deal with.

Mineta Transportation Institute
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WELCOMING REMARKS, LOS ANGELES, MARCH 293
Participants at the Los Angeles summit session were welcomed by:
•

John Allison, Division Chief, New Technology and Research, California
Department of Transportation (Caltrans)

•

John Catoe, Deputy CEO of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA)

•

Rod Diridon, Executive Director of the Mineta Transportation Institute
(MTI)

•

Bob Sassaman, District 7 Director, Caltrans

Rod Diridon began the session by thanking participants and acknowledging
MTA’s Executive Director John Snoble and Snoble’s deputy, John Catoe (who
represented MTA at the L.A. session). Diridon also thanked MTA staff
members who had arranged for the Los Angeles meeting space. Following
John Allison’s welcoming remarks, Diridon thanked Allison and Wes Lum of
Caltrans for coordinating Caltrans strong collaborative relationship with MTI.
Diridon closed the welcoming session by describing handout materials
provided to participants:
Handout Material
•

List of MTI research projects already completed or underway; Diridon
stressed that many MTI projects were related to transportation security and
that all are available in HTML and PDF formats at MTI’s website.

•

Background material on MTI graduate programs and two recent
newsletters—including one featuring MTI Board of Trustees member Celia
Kupersmith (who is also Executive Director of the Golden Gate Bridge and
Transportation Highway District as well as Chair-elect of the American
Public Transit Association).

•

Caltrans questionnaire requesting participants to identify research needs
regarding terrorism and disaster response. Diridon urged a prompt
response, as answers would be compiled immediately and discussed in the
afternoon and evening sessions by an American Association of State

3

Not a verbatim transcript. Housekeeping arrangements, sensitive security information and
biographical material appearing elsewhere in this report have also been deleted.
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Highway and Transportation (AASHTO) committee. His request was
reiterated by Caltrans’ John Allison, who was responsible for the survey.
•

Resumes of all presenters, which participants were urged to read so that
oral introductions could be abbreviated to save time.

Diridon expressed his special gratitude to MTI’s research and publications
assistant Sonya Cardenas and office assistant Amy Yan for driving overnight
from Oakland to Los Angeles to bring handout materials, after having worked
all day at the Oakland session.
John Catoe welcomed participants on behalf of MTA and briefly described
MTA’s efforts to upgrade the safety of L.A.’s light rail and subway systems—
systems he characterized as already “the safest environment in Los Angeles
County.” Catoe thanked the L.A. police department and county sheriff’s
department for working closely with MTA’s security chief, Paul Lennon, to
help make MTA as safe as possible. Based on the recommendations of the
L.A. police chief, Catoe reported that MTA planned to replace the current
barrier-free system with a barrier system in order to enhance security. He also
indicated additional MTA steps to protect transit users in Los Angeles,
including renegotiating security contracts and investing in capital
improvements. Catoe told participants that “There is no question in my mind
that this is a war that we’re involved in—a war to disrupt the American way of
life. And we can’t let that happen.” He urged participants to help protect
transportation facilities in this country by “listening, learning and acting” on
the ideas shared by the experts at the L.A. summit session because “We need to
stop the attacks before they occur, not just respond to them.”
Caltrans’ John Allison thanked Rod Diridon and MTI terrorism specialist
Brian Jenkins for having the foresight to propose transportation security
research several years before 9/11. Allison was proud that Caltrans helped to
fund that early research, and he also praised Diridon and Jenkins for quickly
putting together a national transportation security conference in Washington,
D.C. just six weeks after 9/1l. Caltrans’ director, Jeff Morales, had spoken at
the Washington meeting, finding the session so valuable that he had given
Caltrans’ strong support for holding this summit for local transportation
officials in both L.A. and the Bay Area, California.
Bob Sassaman of Caltrans added his welcome to the summit, reiterating
Caltrans’ thanks to Rod Diridon and MTA, as well as to Caltrans’ Jeff Morales
for arranging the summit. Sassaman briefly described Caltrans’ pre-9/11
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preparations and experience in dealing with emergency events affecting
transportation, including earthquakes, floods, forest fires, HazMat spills and
major vehicle accidents. He also mentioned Caltrans’ pre-9/11 anti-terrorism
preparations for the 1984 Olympics, the 1994 World Cup, the opening of
Highway 105 (the Century Freeway) attended by the first President Bush, as
well as the 2000 Democratic National Convention. Despite this prior
experience dealing with security issues, Sassaman felt that 9/11 raised new
challenges for transportation system providers and operators:
•

How to change the design and operations of facilities;

•

How to employ innovative technologies such as intelligent transportation
systems to provide better protection and responses to terrorism; and

•

How to protect landmarks and other potential targets such as the Vincent
Thomas Bridge, the Golden Gate Bridge, the Bay Bridge, the Coronado
Bridge, transit systems, airports—and the roads that lead to these facilities.

Sassaman then described protective steps that Caltrans had already taken:
•

Joining multi-agency security
enhancements to structures;

assessment

teams

to

recommend

•

Working with California Highway Patrol (CHP) and National Guard to
post armed personnel at key locations, including the Mexican border;

•

Joining Governor Davis’ state-level strategic committee on terrorism,
working closely with its transportation subcommittee and the CHP to
identify ways to protect transportation assets;

•

Planning both active and passive security enhancements for selected
bridges and tunnels; active enhancements would include cameras and
motion detectors; passive measures would include fences, locks, removing
of “blind spots;”

•

Reviewed and updated emergency preparedness plans for emergency
operations center and transportation magnet centers; and

•

Worked with national effort to expand transportation security research.

Sassaman urged participants and the organizations they represented to consider
taking additional measures to enhance transportation security such as working
more closely with intelligence agencies and the law enforcement community,
focusing on areas of organizational competence and expertise to avoid
duplication of effort. He also felt that the transportation community should
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work harder on improving inter-organizational communication and sharing
communication. Sassaman believes that these policy issues should also be
addressed at the federal level and thanked MTI for “assembling a panel of
some of the best experts to help us address some of these issues.”

Mineta Transportation Institute
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MORNING PANEL: “PROTECTING PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS AGAINST TERRORISM”
Moderated by MTI Executive Director Rod Diridon
Diridon characterized the morning panelists as the distinguished experts on
surface transportation terrorism. Brian Jenkins, a former White House
Commissioner on Airline Safety and Security, as well as MTI’s principal
investigator on terrorism, opened the morning panel with a provocative
situation briefing describing current research on the severity and nature of the
terrorist threat. At the Oakland session, he was followed by the emergency
services coordinator of Sonoma County, California, Sandy Covall-Alves, who
discussed planning for emergency response. (At the Los Angeles session, Dr.
Frances Edwards-Winslow, Director of Emergency Preparedness for the City
of San Jose, California, replaced Sandy Covall-Alves for the emergency
response presentation.) The final morning panelist at both sessions was San
José State University professor, MTI researcher and KNTV political
commentator, Dr. Larry Gerston, who discussed the political and economic
fallout, both international and domestic, caused by the U.S. response to 9/11.
BRIAN JENKINS: NATURE AND SEVERITY OF THE TERRORIST
THREAT
Jenkins reviewed pre-9/11 research on terrorism, including his own experience
as a security consultant to the World Trade Center after the 1993 attack,
followed by analysis of lessons learned from the 9/11 attack itself. Jenkins
believes that the probability of future attacks remains very high. He described
the changing federal role in transportation security, including expanding the
current focus on airline security to include other modes of transportation. He
spoke briefly about the lessons of the 25-year IRA terrorist campaign in Great
Britain and the 1995 Sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system.
Jenkins concluded by emphasizing that surface transportation systems are not
only potential terrorist targets, they can also provide shelter or evacuate
thousands of people.
What We Knew Before 9/11
Jenkins contended that credible research on terrorism and transportation was
well underway prior to 9/11. As evidence, he cited the ability of MTI to
quickly put together the Washington, D.C. National Transportation Security
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Summit on transportation and terrorism within weeks of 9/11. As early as
1974, Jenkins’ himself had written a paper identifying the World Trade Center
(WTC) as “a likely target for a major terrorist event” because of the role the
twin towers played as symbols of America’s global power.
After the first WTC bombing in 1993, Jenkins helped design new security
measures for the complex. Planners had considered the possibility of a plane
crashing into the buildings, designing them to “withstand a direct hit by a 747
jet.” However, the buildings could not take “the burning fuel…which melted
the steel…which caused the collapse.” Despite the possibility of an attack from
the air, consultants had concluded that defensive measures, such as placing
anti-aircraft weapons on the roof of the WTC were not feasible.
However, the ’93 WTC security review did result in correcting ventilation
problems in the evacuation stairwells, revealed by observing videotapes of
people “coming out of the building choking, their faces black with smoke.”
Building occupants were encouraged to take part in stairwell evacuation drills.
As a consequence of these rehearsals and other preparations, 25,000 people did
get out of the WTC on September 11.
Jenkins also reported analyst concerns shared at a Washington meeting on
terrorism he attended just three weeks before 9/11. “We reviewed lessons
learned from the past 30 years and looked ahead to the challenges we thought
we faced in the near future.” Less than a month before the WTC attack, senior
terrorism specialists had predicted that a catastrophic attack killing not simply
hundreds, but thousands of people was likely. The biggest threat they foresaw
was from the Middle East; the use of biological, chemical, or radiological
dispersal weapons could not be ruled out.
We knew that Al-Qaida was a threat. We knew Al-Qaida could coordinate
synchronized intercontinental operations. We knew that a plot by one of the
’93 WTC bombers—Ramsy Yousef—to drop 11 U.S. wide-bodied
airplanes in the Pacific, which would have killed several thousand people,
had been narrowly thwarted in the Philippines.
According to Jenkins, one trend of particular concern to terrorism specialists
has been the steady escalation in the magnitude of terrorist attacks over the
decades. Casualties have risen from “the tens” during the 1970s to multiples of
10 in the 80s and 90s and now up to the thousands as of 9/11. At a recent
meeting, Jenkins reported exploring plausible terrorist attack scenarios that
could produce hundreds of thousands of casualties in Washington.
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Jenkins’ background prepared him to grasp the magnitude of 9/11 while it was
still underway. When notified about the incident about six minutes after the
first WTC crash—
I knew this wasn’t an accident. My second conclusion was “there’s a
second plane, a third plane, a fourth plane, a fifth.” I thought there were six
out there. What was at the back of my mind was the [recollection that]
synchronized attacks that had been talked about by terrorists back in the
mid-‘90s.
Lessons Learned From 9/11
One dramatic change since 9/11, is that Jenkins no longer has to convince his
listeners that the terrorist threat is real. This was not always so. He recounted
his experience while serving on the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security in 1996-97, attempting to persuade Congress to devote
more resources to aviation security.
I remember being asked repeatedly, “Mr. Jenkins, when was the last
hijacking we had in this country?”(It had been about ten years before.)
“Well, why are we going to be putting in these new measures, which are
going to cost a lot, when there is no apparent threat.” It was a tough
sell…After September 11, that’s no longer an issue.
Another lesson underscored by 9/11, Jenkins says, is that “In some cases… you
need to throw out the procedures.” On 9/11, the subway attendant working
beneath the World Trade Center ordered incoming passengers to remain on the
trains, rather than allowing them to get off. As many additional passengers as
possible were crammed aboard and the trains ordered to move out. By the time
the buildings fell, the station had been empty for 40 minutes. This was
accomplished because a low-level subway employee had been delegated the
authority to suspend normal procedures as a result of lessons learned in the ’93
WTC bombing.
Bioterrorism
While Jenkins does not believe that the author of the anthrax letters took orders
from Osama bin Laden, “The fact is that [after 9/11] bio-terrorism is now a
reality.” He pointed out that even the experts had failed to anticipate the
crippling impact of such incidents. “All the gaming that we did with bioterrorism missed one critical thing: Long-term, persistent contamination can
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close down a building or transit system for a long time.” As Jenkins put it,
having health authorities declare that contamination has been reduced to a
“manageable level of spores” may not convince public transit riders to climb
aboard.
Another problem not fully anticipated by Jenkins and his fellow experts was
the extraordinary cascading effects of a terrorist attack:
The effects were not just on New York, but throughout the country. We
grounded every plane in the country. We shut down the borders. We had
trucks backed up for two hundred miles south of the Mexican border.
…With “just-in-time” inventories, if you shut down the bridges for 18
hours… you start shutting down the production lines in this country.
This means, Jenkins says, that transportation security measures must minimize
the disruptive impact of security on people who use public transportation.
“Otherwise, we are going to create a tremendous drag on our economy and we
are going to create some tension between the authorities and the public on
these issues.”
Threat Level Remains Very High
Jenkins believes that complacency is very dangerous now. He believes we are
already seeing a desperate desire on the part of the American people to return
to normality, leading many to hope that September 11 was a “one-time
anomaly.”
Jenkins strongly disagrees. “I think there were two plans on September 10.
One was for the September 11 attacks. The second was the business continuity
plan for Al-Qaida.” Jenkins is certain that the terrorists knew they were going
to get hit—and that they took measures to protect their operations and finances.
As evidence, he reminded his listeners that “a lot of Al-Qaida supporters
disappeared just before September 11, or just after.” While thousands of arrests
have been made world-wide, “about half have already been released.”
Paradoxically, Jenkins points out, while mass arrests may disrupt some
operations, it also means that security forces temporarily “go blind.” Prior to
arrest, many of the suspects had already been under close surveillance to track
their actions and contacts. Now that they are incarcerated, security forces
cannot use them to find other suspects.
In Jenkins’ view, the war against terrorism:
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…is an open-ended contest…that is going to go on for years: We know that
large-scale terrorism is their goal… They have stated it. They have
demonstrated it… The documents found in Afghanistan confirm it.
As Jenkins sees it, Al-Qaida was built over 15-20 years, and it will “take us
ten years to rip this thing apart.” However, he also emphasizes that we don’t
yet have evidence of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction:
What we have is evidence of such aspirations. We know they seek such
weapons. With their mindset, if they get their hands on unconventional
weapons, they will use them.
Even if Al-Qaida is “kept on the run and can’t regroup,” Jenkins believes we
can expect a shift to smaller scale operations by local cells that do not require
centralized coordination. If that happens, he speculated that Americans might
even come to tolerate smaller scale operations that occasionally “bring down
an airplane somewhere.”
Such tolerance is unlikely for large-scale attacks:
But another 9/11, we cannot afford. Not a year from now, not two years
from now, not five years from now, not ten years from now. I begin to
sound like Senator Cato in the ancient Roman Senate, who finished every
speech with “And furthermore, Carthage must be destroyed.” And
furthermore, Al-Qaida must be destroyed.
If a decentralized Al-Qaida does decide to focus on smaller, less-defensible
targets, Jenkins believes that many are likely to be transportation-related,
because transportation targets offer “concentrations of people in confined
environments where you can enhance the effects of explosives or chemical
weapons or biological substances.” However, Jenkins contends that these
attacks, so far, have not focused on actually destroying transportation systems
themselves. When the new breed of religiously-motivated terrorists do go after
surface transportation, their objective is usually not to disrupt, but to kill.
Transportation systems make a good “killing field” for terrorists because they
kill more people.
Overall, terrorism generally results in 21 percent fatalities [fatalities occur
in one out of five incidents]. In surface transportation attacks, about 37
percent involve fatalities. When you move to transportation, the lethality
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level goes up. Seventy-four percent of these fatal attacks involve multiple
fatalities—and 23 percent involved 10 or more fatalities.
Jenkins reports that attacks on transportation over the years appear to be “about
evenly split” between buses and bus terminals on one hand, and subways,
trains, and train stations on the other. The disruptive impact of actual attacks is
significantly compounded by the use of bomb threats. Only one-tenth of one
percent of transportation-related incidents involve actual attacks. “About
99.999 percent involve bomb threats” that disrupt systems without an actual
attack.
Shifting Focus Away From Airlines
Jenkins believes that “the pressure is on” for government to go beyond the
current preoccupation with aviation security toward enhancing security for all
modes of transportation. However, he does not share the view of some
transportation leaders that the same kind of security measures that now
confront airline passengers should automatically be extended to bus terminals,
railroad stations, and cruise ships.
That’s not going to work so easily. And I am not sure I know how to do that
easily. We have 450 commercial airports in this country, and it is going to
take us several years just to deploy the explosive detection technology
needed to cover these airports.
Jenkins is also concerned that the current level of publicity given to “egregious
lapses of performance” of transportation security operations (such as airport
screeners who miss weapons in luggage or magnetometers that are left
unplugged), while well-intentioned, may be counterproductive. While no
security system is 100 percent effective, even a “50 or 60 percent” detection
rate can have a deterrent effect. For the would-be adversary, “these are lousy
odds. You wouldn’t play Russian Roulette with three bullets in a revolver.”
Security is always part illusion and part reality. If we destroy the illusion by
over emphasizing our security lapses, we may entice rather than deter potential
attackers.
Increasing Federal Role/Advanced Technology
An increased federal role in transportation security is virtually certain, Jenkins
says. But he questions congressional proposals that call for deploying
federalized guards at nuclear power stations, airports, and train stations. We
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don’t have enough National Guardsmen, Jenkins says. And federalizing the
two million people now employed by the private security industry would
create a federal force “larger than our armed forces during the height of the
Cold War, at enormous cost.” Jenkins opposes what he calls castles and cops
security strategies that emphasize concrete barriers and adding more guards, an
approach he feels could permanently hobble the U.S. economy.
What we will see instead, he predicts, is an increased federal role in the
deployment of advanced technology. Jenkins warns that there are no
technological silver bullets. “Technology still has to be operated by human
beings.” He reminded listeners that putting explosive detection machines at all
airports will require up to 15,000 additional personnel “and no one has
budgeted for these people yet.” He also counseled that we have yet to
effectively use the technology already deployed at airports. “ We don’t have an
integrated system at airports. What we have is an accumulation of 25 years of
individual security measures and hardware…they are not connected with one
another.”
Despite the inherent limits of technology, Jenkins sees significant potential
value in what he calls “smart solutions.”
We can’t inspect every container coming into the country. We can’t inspect
every vehicle coming across a bridge. But we can put new technologies and
procedures in place at points of inspection, to increase the odds that we will
detect terrorist weapons before they can be deployed.
Some technology options would require the public to accept new limits on
freedom of movement. Jenkins believes that we “are obliged to explore things
like national identity cards” and consider architectural design solutions
whenever building or retrofitting transportation facilities. As an illustration of
a design solution, he cited the off-site baggage check-in at the Tokyo Central
Air Terminal. Passengers deposit luggage at a remote site before proceeding to
the airport proper. Baggage can be examined without disrupting the flow of
passengers, who remain separated from their luggage until they arrive at their
final airport destination.
Lessons Learned From the IRA and Tokyo Subway Attacks
Jenkins urged his listeners to study the historical research included in their
handout materials. To illustrate the value of these materials, he pointed to the
handout analyzing 25 years of IRA attacks on London’s public transit system.
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The large number of IRA attacks over the years ultimately made it easier for
the British to analyze patterns and install countermeasures. Today, five
thousand cameras and a very alert public keep watch over the London Tube.
“British authorities are convinced that any suspicious object will be reported to
them within minutes.” Unfortunately, the American public is not currently
providing this level of support to our transportation security officials.
Jenkins also described the 1995 Sarin nerve gas attack on Tokyo’s subway
system. The dispersal method was crude: Five attackers dropped eleven plastic
bags containing Sarin on the floor in five subway trains, puncturing each bag
with the sharpened end of an umbrella. To avoid exposure to nerve gas,
attackers tried to leave the trains quickly, although each had self-administered
atropine with them in the event they were exposed (as some of them were).
Fortunately, Sarin is heavier than air and therefore remained low to the ground.
Had the agent risen higher, to mouth or nose level, Jenkins believes there
would have been hundreds or even thousands dead.
Even so, 5,500 sick people (some of them dying) spilled off the trains during
rush hour and out into the streets, creating chaos. This underscores a major
point that U.S. transportation officials should ponder: Of the 5,500 people with
symptoms during the Tokyo attack, only 1,200 had actually been exposed to
nerve gas; the other 4,300 were suffering from anxiety attacks—asthma, heart
attacks, or psychosomatic, hysteria-induced illnesses. Panic is likely to be a
major component of any future chemical or biological attack on U.S.
transportation. Consider what might happen, Jenkins suggested, if some
scientist went on the air during a biological attack and said, “watch out for flulike symptoms.” 55 million Americans get flu-like symptoms every year. The
U.S. health care system would be overwhelmed. Jenkins also emphasized that
the Tokyo attack was exacerbated by the unwillingness of transportation
officials to close the system down; the trains kept running, exposing more and
more people to the toxic agent.
Transportation as a Civil Defense Resource
Jenkins concluded his prepared remarks by discussing the use of transportation
to actually bolster civil defense during a terrorist attack. Alluding to possible
“dirty bombs” and other weapons of mass destruction, Jenkins noted, “We
cannot think about transportation solely as a target.” For certain kinds of
scenarios, he observed, it may be desirable to move people into subway tunnels
to protect them. Transportation is also essential for evacuation. During the 9/11
attack, mass transit quickly moved hundreds of thousands of people to safer
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locations in both Washington, D.C. and New York. Public transportation also
played a major logistical support role by moving emergency personnel and
supplies to where they were needed.
SANDY COVALL-ALVES AND FRANCES EDWARDS-WINSLOW:
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND POST-ATTACK RECOVERY
PLANNING
California emergency preparedness coordinators Sandy Covall-Alves and
Frances Edwards-Winslow discussed emergency preparedness and post-attack
recovery programs in two separate presentations, one at each of the two
summit sessions. Their respective comments in Oakland (Covall-Alves) and
L.A. (Edwards-Winslow) followed approximately the same outline and are
integrated as a single precis for this summary.
Both presenters consider advance planning for terrorist threats to be a subset of
advance planning for all threats, an approach they call All-Hazard Emergency
Preparedness. With slight variations, both presenters discussed emergency
preparedness under seven subheadings: (1) Threat Analysis; (2) Coordination
with Partners; (3) Use of Existing Plans; (4) Written Plans; (5) Emergency
Operations Centers; (6) Training Exercises, and (7) Dual Use.4
Covall-Alves emphasized that how well disaster agencies respond to an
emergency is not only critical to saving lives, reducing injuries, and limiting
property damage, it is also critical to restoring the public trust and expediting
financial recovery. The longer it takes emergency responders to restore
services, “the longer it will take for everybody else to get back in business.”
The key to an effective emergency response, in her view, is thorough planning
and preparedness.
Edwards-Winslow concurred, observing that many lives were saved on 9/11
because:
The transit workers knew what to do. They knew to get the trains and the
passengers away from harm. There were people in the building (WTC)
who had participated in evacuation drills. And they knew when to leave

4

A term of art for using the same basic approach for all emergencies, both large and small. This
approach helps to familiarize staff with emergency protocols by using even minor events as a
rehearsal for “the big one.”
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when there was a problem. And so we can probably credit thousands of
saved lives to previous training and planning.
Edwards-Winslow also emphasized the importance of an emergency plan for
restoring the public trust, noting that the average citizen watching television on
9/11 was heartened by the obvious competence and courage of front-line
service personnel (police, fire, rescue workers, environmental protection
workers). The public was also impressed by the quick flow of disaster workers
to New York City from all over the country. This happened because plans were
in place: New York City had a plan; the State of New York had a plan; and the
Federal government had a plan.
Seven Components of Emergency Preparedness Planning
1. Threat Analysis
California has been called “America’s disaster theme park.” Covall-Alves
believes that threat analysis (sometimes called risk assessment) is the first step
in emergency planning. Because natural and human-caused disasters share
common characteristics, she urged the case for “all-hazard” emergency
planning, reciting the long list of natural hazards she had to prepare for,
including earthquakes, floods, fires, “and even tsunamis” (tidal waves)—as
well as human-caused hazards, ranging from power-outages to terrorism. The
range of possible hazards, in her view, mandates an inclusive approach.
Edwards-Winslow agreed, adding the caveat that disaster planners should not
focus “too much on one kind of emergency.” Planners must prepare for all
possibilities, including those that are “out of fashion.” A recent catastrophe
may temporarily stimulate a higher level of interest in one type of threat, “but
as memory fades, interest tails off.” Both speakers made the point that the
probability of a particular kind of event varies considerably, even within a
single service area. Contingency plans for a regional response must therefore
take into account the total range of possible threats to the entire service area.
2. Planning Committee
Covall-Alves strongly advocates creating such a regional planning committee,
led by a professional emergency planner. This committee should include
representatives from all functional areas (police, fire, medical, public health,
etc.) and should have the visible and active support of top level executives and
managers. “In the Bay Area we have ABAG—the Association of Bay Area
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Governments, MTC and BATWING—the Bay Area Terrorism Working
Group.”
Edwards-Winslow concurred. You need a regional planning committee
because:
No matter how brilliant one person may be, they still have a limited view.
Managing and recovering from a major disaster requires the expertise of all
the professions. A professional planner should play a leading role, because
that person has a full-time commitment to making sure that emergency
preparedness happens.
3. Planning Partners
Covall-Alves insisted that the government’s planning committee must also
work in partnership with utility companies (power, water systems,
communications) and other non-government stakeholders. Steps must also be
taken to make sure that all facets of a region’s transportation system are
explicitly included in the emergency planning process.
Edwards-Winslow agreed, stating that partners are needed from all the
functional areas that will have to work together in a disaster, including utilities.
She was especially concerned that employee unions are represented, because
“If they are not at the table from the beginning, they can become a tremendous
opponent for you.” Edwards-Winslow emphasized the need to integrate and
coordinate across jurisdictional boundaries, echoing Covall-Alves point about
the need for highly visible support by executive management.
4. Multi-Functional Plans
Covall-Alves discussed California’s Standardized Emergency Management
System (SEMS), which coordinates the functions of multiple agencies during
an emergency. It is imperative, she says, for emergency operations plans to
address accountability by establishing a clear-cut chain-of-command. In
California, all cities and counties use the same planning template to specify
how they plan to assure continuity of leadership when government operations
are disrupted. This command and control structure coordinates fire, police,
medical, public works and other local government functions, plus volunteer
resources such as the Red Cross and amateur radio. California’s contingency
plans also include specific annexes, such as a Multi-Casualty Incident Plan, a
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Weapons of Mass Destruction Plan, a Bioterrorism Plan and plans for flood,
earthquake, fire, civil unrest, HazMat or a tsunami.
Edwards-Winslow also spoke about California’s SEMS program, adding the
caveat that transportation might itself be a terrorist target. She reiterated the
need for a well established chain-of-command in advance of an attack so that
all elected officials and policy-makers would know what their role would be
during an emergency
5. Emergency Operations Center
Covall-Alves urged listeners to make sure that their jurisdiction not only had
an Emergency Operations Center (EOC), but also that their specific agency
had an EOC. “That’s where all your key personnel come together to coordinate
response and recovery.” She also urged participants to make sure they had an
emergency communications infrastructure in place, including a public relations
plan. People must be trained in advance to work with the media and key media
contacts should be lined up in advance. Agencies should also have backup
records and logistical support available so that a facility can quickly move to a
new location and promptly get back in business.
Edwards-Winslow emphasized the need to coordinate with neighborhood
groups as well as government agencies during an emergency: “When you have
bus and transit problems, use these networks to get people to carpool.”
6. Training Exercises
Covall-Alves felt that the key to effective emergency preparedness is to hold
training exercises, urging agencies to conduct three kinds of exercises: (1)
annual tabletop exercises to introduce or review functional procedures; (2)
annual controlled simulations for EOCs, including “partnership” review
exercises where representatives of all agencies and functions, including nongovernment agencies, can evaluate and review their plans together. These
exercises should include transit representatives. Finally, (3) hold a full-scale
field exercise, including active responders, every two years.
Edwards-Winslow emphasized that it was essential to include transit agencies
in training exercises. “When we did a study in the Bay Area, we learned that in
an earthquake 1,400 road segments could be taken down.” Only by planning
ahead with transit agencies can planners come up with the substitutions and
rerouting needed to cope with a large-scale incident.
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7. Dual-Use
Covall-Alves suggested using contingency planning for small planned events
(a scheduled mass demonstration, sporting events) as exercises to test an
agency’s ability to handle a larger, unplanned emergency. These events allow
agencies to practice working together, update communications plans (phone
numbers and radio frequencies) and build trust with each other and the media.
Edwards-Winslow agreed, adding that using special events or celebrity visits
as practice exercises, allows staff members from different agencies to get
acquainted on a face to face basis, so that in an emergency people will know
whom to call. “They will have confidence in each other because they have
worked together in the past.”
DR. LARRY GERSTON: POLITICAL AND PUBLIC POLICY
ASPECTS OF TERRORISM AFTER 9/11
Dr. Gerston characterized the general impact of any crisis on politics and
public policy as a “three-act play,” beginning with (I) the immediate crisis,
moving through (II) the political and policy response to the crisis and finally,
(III) the polity’s reaction to this response. With respect to 9/11, Gerston
believes the U.S. is now “straddling” Acts I and II. He outlined four political
and policy challenges to dealing with terrorism: (i) institutional disarray, (ii)
restrictions on civil liberties, (iii) the mounting costs of the U.S. response, and,
finally, (iv) how governmental responsibility for dealing with terrorism should
be apportioned among federal, state and local levels of government. His
conclusion was that the ultimate cost of 9/11, both fiscal and political, will be
“staggering,” irrevocably changing the way we live.
“Three Act Play”
Act I—The Crisis
According to Gerston, the first political and policy consequence of any major
crisis is that it shatters the political equilibrium, generating some kind of call to
action. Such a crisis need not be a political event; a major earthquake can
disturb a regional political system. In the case of 9/11, the immediate demand
for action by the political system was immense and the expected scale of
government’s response will be correspondingly large.
Act II—Policy Response
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The second phase consists of government’s response begins with the need to
forge some kind of consensus for action among policy makers at all levels.
This will result in a new political equilibrium. In the case of 9/11, America’s
response could not be antiseptic, modest, or neutral. The magnitude of this
response virtually guarantees that some political stakeholders benefit, while
others will be hurt. Winners and losers can be expected to respond accordingly.
9/11 has altered America’s political system forever.
Act III—Reaction to New Policies
New policies generate reactions from various political stakeholders—the
public, interest groups, and from the policy-makers themselves “who have
their necks on the line.” These responses, in turn, become new inputs to the
policy process, generating further adjustments in government’s response. “So
the policy making process…is sort of like a Ferris wheel. It’s ongoing. Some
issues get on there and stay on for a long time and never quite get resolved.”
With respect to 9/11, Gerston believes that we are somewhere between Act I
and Act II. The initial days of “flags everywhere” are over; the “edges of that
consensus are beginning to fray with each passing day.”
In Gerston’s view, international support for the U.S. is waning and “many of us
do not realize the extent to which we’re boxed in by our partners.” As
examples he cited Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to let us use their bases; Malaysia,
with its huge fundamentalist population; Indonesia, Russia, Pakistan and even
France, which opposes U.S. plans to seek the death penalty for captured
terrorists. Gerston also reminded his listeners about the oil factor: “70 percent
of the world’s oil reserves lie in the Middle East. You couple that with the fact
that almost 60 percent of America’s oil is imported and you’ve got yourself a
recipe for disaster.”
Four Political Challenges
(i) Institutional Disarray
Simply ordering the Office of Homeland Security into existence and
appointing Tom Ridge director, with instructions to supervise the terrorism
related activities of 200 agencies and organizations, does not automatically
guarantee that anything will happen. “You can’t just impose or superimpose a
bureaucracy.” That is why Gerston says, “Six months after the fact [9/11], this
country remains in institutional disarray.” No one knows exactly what to do,
and until Congress creates a mandated authority, Ridge’s ability to direct
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homeland security efforts “is based truly on his ability to persuade and little
more.” In terms of specific issues yet to be resolved, Gerston spoke of the need
to clarify the responsibilities of the CIA and the FBI. The traditional division
of labor (outside U.S.—CIA; inside U.S.—FBI) cannot be used when dealing
with international terrorists operating inside the U.S. He also specifically
mentioned the need to clarify how the INS and Customs Service (including the
Border Patrol) should coordinate activities.
Gerston believes that 9/11 has created a crisis for American federalism, the
way national, state, and local governments interact with one another. Which
level of government is supposed to respond to what? Is the federal government
going to take on all the responsibilities (and costs) related to terrorism? What
about terrorist activities that involve more than one state—who has
responsibility? Gerston says all of these issues must be worked out; “We’re
writing the book every day. The ink is still wet!”
(ii) Civil liberties
The Attorney General and state police organizations have been given expanded
powers (wiretaps, electronic surveillance, getting into e-mail and the
Internet)—all new and some say long overdue. Detention and search warrants
are easier to obtain. How do we deal with this? At first, everybody said, “Good
idea. Go get the bad guys.” Now many are having second thoughts. But if we
curtail these new powers, won’t that allow the bad guys to get back where they
were? These issues are not easy; either way the nation chooses to go will be
“yet another crack in the unity pavement.”
(iii) How do we pay for all of this?
Gerston estimated that the federal government had already spent $100 billion
in response to 9/11. These are not one-time expenses. Gerston believes that
many of the emergency expenditures ($20 billion for homeland security, $4
billion for airport security, $13 billion more for defense) will have to be
repeated annually for the foreseeable future. 9/11 has already brought about the
first federal deficit since 1997, and added $31 billion in additional
expenditures for unemployment, creating new pressures to use the Social
Security surplus. Coupled with the current recession, the costs of the antiterrorism efforts have serious political consequences.
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(iv) Impact on State and Local Government
Gerston contends that, “As of now, the Federal government is not providing
nearly enough money to the states for security.” As proof, he cited last
November’s National Governor’s Association estimate that, by June 2002, 9/
11 would have cost the states $15 billion. California Highway Patrol
Commissioner Spike Helmick estimates that law enforcement agencies in
California alone have post—9/11 needs of more than $2 billion. “Some people
estimate that it’s going to cost us $300 million just to safeguard the state’s
waterways.” California has already requested reimbursement for $350 million
in terrorism-related expenses; so far Washington has only offered $100
million; that’s one-quarter of a billion dollars short—and California already
had a $12-15 billion deficit.
Gerston estimates that the combined deficit of the 50 states exceeds $50 billion
for this fiscal year. It is not clear at all where they can get the $15-20 billion
they need for security. Gerston asked,
Who will be responsible for the protection of train stations, highway
systems—including bridges and tunnels—and key power plant
installations? And what about protecting America’s 100 nuclear power
plants, not to mention water facilities, waterways, major public buildings,
and antiterrorism facilities?
If we’re short on funds already…where is it all going to come from?
Changing the Way We Live
“Terrorism is not merely the first war of the 21st century,” Gerston concluded.
“It is likely to be an ongoing war with no end in sight.” And this war, he
believes, will require a major shift in American values and alter our
relationship with the rest of the world; it will require restrictions on civil
liberties; and it will have huge financial consequences. As a consequence, he
expects 9/11 to fundamentally reshape our political system. From here on out,
all government at all levels will have to include major security expenditures as
a permanent part of their budgets. “The cost of fully protecting American
society will be staggering. But more than that, the cost of fully protecting
American society will change the way we live.”
Rod Diridon closed the March 29, 2002, Los Angeles morning panel with the
observation that, “Every time I hear these three, I kind of gulp and imagine the
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train wreck we are about to face in terms of the huge financial costs of
protecting ourselves and preparing a response program.”
That “train wreck” would be exacerbated, Diridon said, by the growing level of
complacency.
“We were absolutely frantic after 9/11; now we are beginning to grumble about
airport delays and the other inconveniences. Yet we’re going to be hit again. It
isn’t a maybe. It’s rather how and when.” He summed up his reaction to the
morning panel by observing that the most important task ahead was keeping
the public’s concern at a high enough level to support appropriate counter
measures. “That’s why we are here. It’s to let you know that the situation is
dire—and to give you the tools to do the job.”
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SUMMARIZED QUESTIONS & ANSWERS FOR MORNING
PANEL
OAKLAND SUMMIT SESSION, MARCH 28, 2002
MIKE DUNCAN, SUISUN CITY, SOLANO COUNTY
What is being done for rail and passenger security, since virtually every major
metropolitan area has major rail lines and the potential for “dirty bombs”
seems great?
BRIAN JENKINS
Different threats require different responses:
(1) Detecting explosives or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) aboard
freight cars. Researchers are exploring better ways to track containerized
freight at every stage of shipment, from point of origin all the way to the final
recipient along the lines pioneered by UPS and FedEx. Containers could be
tracked via GPS, providing real-time location; new technology could also be
used to detect tampering during transit. However, improved freight security
will also require physical redesign to harden containers to resist breaking open
if derailed (as has already been done in the case of HazMat tank cars).
(2) Protecting passengers on trains. Unless major incidents occur, we are
unlikely to screen passengers and baggage at train stations at the level now
required at airports; with respect to commuter rail, with no advanced ticket
sales and lots of passengers getting on and off, strict screening is not feasible.
(3) Protecting the track itself. Historically terrorists derail trains to kill people,
rather than disrupt lines of communication. Advanced surveillance technology
can be deployed to help monitor the integrity of rail systems; however
protecting “long lines,” whether pipelines, power lines or rail lines—is
extraordinarily difficult. Near term, the best we can expect are modest
improvements in container tracking and the transport of hazardous materials.
Fast Track Border Crossing
Jenkins then reported on his recent trip to the U.S.-Canadian border to evaluate
a new “fast-track” system that lets established shippers speed through customs
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by completing paperwork in advance. Unrecognized or unregistered shippers
receive closer scrutiny. However, screening drivers remains a major problem:
Driving a truck across the border is an entry-level position for many Canadian
immigrants of dubious origin, who, nonetheless, continue to drive big trucks
into the United States.
SHERRIE ANDERSON
At Secretary Mineta’s direction, U.S. DOT has been looking at rail and freight
security very closely since 9/11, consulting with experts and national
laboratories about possible technology solutions. The Secretary is especially
concerned about freight containers going through high-density neighborhoods.
U.S. DOT study groups are also considering credentialing rail and bus
passengers and other forms of transportation ID. U.S. DOT has partnered with
the Customs Service, and the Association of American Railroads (which is
working closely with railroad police), to make sure rail shipments are safe.
However, Anderson warns, “we don’t have any quick solutions.”
Even before 9/11, U.S. DOT had been working with the FAA (which has done
a lot of testing of this kind of equipment) to evaluate possible technologies for
screening passengers in the rail environment. U.S. DOT has also been
evaluating portable, hand-held explosives detector. This technology is still
under review, however Homeland Security’s Governor Ridge recently
convened a two-day industry summit to explore this technology option and
others.
DAVID SAIA, CALIFORNIA DOT
Please expand on the point about “institutional disarray.”
LARRY GERSTON
“Well, this disarray is going to be straightened out…but it’s not going to
happen immediately.”
Institutions are, by definition, conservative. It takes time to work out new
organizational relationships. For example, if Homeland Security becomes a
cabinet department, new lines of authority must be drawn throughout the
government. The relationship between the FBI and CIA will have to be
changed. Better and faster ways to coordinate the vertical relationships
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between similar federal, state, and local activities may be required. The 9/11
crisis has precipitated a lot of very serious thinking. Right now, the new
institutional relationships are informal. In the next six to twelve, maybe 18
months, expect some of these relationships to be formalized.
BRIAN JENKINS
There are three forces promoting institutional disarray: organizational
confusion, rising direct costs, and mounting indirect costs.
The U.S. has yet to replace the institutional arrangements constructed to fight
the Cold War with new structures tailored to the challenges that emerged after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. These new challenges include not only the
growth of terrorism, but also drug trafficking, organized crime and a growing
concern about proliferation of WMD. Prior to 9/11 none of these threats was
seen as serious enough to warrant an urgent response by government. Instead
of stimulating innovative approaches, these new threats initially provoked a
proliferation of commissions, panels, committees and working groups, which
were simply “stacked on top of” existing arrangements.
9/11 changed the ground rules. Billions of dollars are at stake. Instead of
interagency committees, the Federal government is creating new cabinet
departments and changing fundamental relationships among long-established
institutions. “Watching that process from the outside you sometimes get the
impression that Osama bin Laden is only Public Enemy Number Two; Enemy
Number One is across the hall.” Jenkins believes that by 2007 the United
States will have significantly reorganized the structures of government to deal
with this new threat.
ROD DIRIDON
(To Brian Jenkins) You indicated that it may take five years to put new security
protections in place. Are we going to become complacent and begin opposing
the inconvenience and costs of these protections?
BRIAN JENKINS
Absent another major terrorist event, the public’s willingness to pay the actual
dollar cost and the hidden cost (in terms of lost time, inconvenience, and other
intrusions) is going to diminish very, very fast. In order to be effective, security
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measures must become far more efficient. What is needed are “smart”
innovations like using identity systems to fast-track frequent flyers, or
redesigning security systems to deal more effectively with peak traffic hours.
We can’t “strip search everyone before they get on an airplane…if it comes to
that, we’re going to shut our economy down.” To avoid the dangers of
complacency, we have to make significant improvements and come up with
smarter systems.
STEVE HEMINGER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SAN FRANCISCO
BAY AREA MTC
The real Public Enemy Number One is complacency. Americans get tired of
long-term issues. We can only take them in “half hour doses”; then we want to
go on to the next show. In the case of terrorism, we’re really talking about
massive, costly investments in infrastructure over many years as well as
significant restrictions on some of our traditional liberties. “We are not used to
making these major shifts.” Unless there is some major terrorist incident,
people are going to be saying a year from now “can’t we go on to something
else?” That is why our leaders must instill in us, at every turn possible, “not so
much the fear factor, but serious awareness.” From now on out, anti-terrorism
must be a permanent line item, like education, roads, or water systems. Not just
day after day, month after month, or year after year, but decade after decade.
That’s why complacency is a very, very serious problem.
PATRICK DUFFY, REGIONAL PLANNER, ABAG
9/11 revealed our economic vulnerability due to the lack of a diverse national
transportation system. Has this created any impetus or momentum toward a
national rail system, or regional rail systems, for passengers and freight?
ROD DIRIDON
It has! Immediately after 9/11, rail travel in the Northeast corridor was up
sharply. Once passengers began to factor in travel time to the airport, waiting
time at the airport, airport security checks, and how long they have to wait for
their luggage at their destination, rail became a more attractive proposition.
Another plus: although rail systems are vulnerable to sabotage, you can’t drive
a train into a skyscraper. So there is an upper limit to potential casualties.
Switching to rail would also benefit the environment and reduce energy
consumption. It may very well make strategic and economic sense to have a
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more diverse transportation system that includes fast rail service.
Unfortunately, rail systems cost a lot of money; I am not sure the federal
government is going to invest in this alternative.
Another response to 9/11 is that a lot of corporations are substituting
videoconferencing for business travel, although this may also be a response to
economic conditions. Businesses are considering new strategies. With today’s
advanced communications systems, does it really make business sense to
physically move people around the country to attend meetings?
LARRY GERSTON
Ironically, the trend right now is away from expanding rail. Amtrak has had a
bad year; there is very serious talk about cutting back because Amtrak is not
self-supporting. “There are only so many dollars in the pie.” If the federal
government were to make rail a national priority, what would have to be cut
elsewhere? We are going through a fundamental reassessment right now. There
is no way we can continue to slice up the pie the same way as in the past.
ROD DIRIDON
National security considerations could make a difference in the future
transportation mix. After all, the need to mobilize and move large armies to
frontiers was a major driving force in the expansion of European rail systems
at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. In fact, double
tracking for military purposes is one of the reasons Europe has a better rail
system than we do today.
STEVE HEMINGER
(To Brian Jenkins) If airport-level security is not feasible for public transit,
what level is appropriate? Are we looking at the London model, with a lot
more video surveillance and active participation in security by passengers?
What is your approach for improving public transit security?
BRIAN JENKINS
The need for a common vocabulary, a standardized system for communicating
threat information to America’s 18,000 local and state police departments, was
clear after 9/11. We had President Bush saying, “Everybody should go about
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their business as normal,” while Attorney General Ashcroft was yelling,
“We’re all going to die by Tuesday.” The British created a four-tier Threat
Condition index called VELLUM that summarized the best available terrorist
threat information, without getting into details about sources and methods of
collection. This threat information was disseminated broadly to local police
departments, transport operators, shopping malls and the like. VELLUM is a
national system but does not require that the entire country be assigned the
same threat status. Based on intelligence, airports and surface transportation or
particular cities might be placed in a higher threat condition than the rest of the
country.
The London model has several noteworthy features: public involvement,
intensive closed-circuit TV (CCTV) surveillance (which has proven to be
extremely effective), and rapid response by the authorities in order to minimize
disruption and ensure public safety. The London authorities keep detailed
month-to-month records of how much time is lost as a result of security-related
incidents. London rail has 5,000 cameras—not counting the cameras on
London streets—and the number is expanding steadily. The London model
produces a collateral benefit: while street crime has been going up, crime on
British rail and the tube has gone down.
“Public involvement” in the London model means far more than posting signs
asking transit passengers to report their suspicions to authorities. It requires a
support infrastructure that makes reporting easy. Call boxes are readily
available in all bus terminals and train stations. Each call box is monitored by
multiple cameras, which show the face of the caller (to deter hoaxes) as well as
the circumstances around the caller at that location. All cameras have pan, tilt,
and zoom capabilities. Heavy camera coverage also makes it easier to conduct
bomb searches. Public involvement and rapid response on the London model
requires a major capital investment.
This investment has paid off. In response to tight surveillance, IRA attacks
moved away from Central London stations to less-covered suburban stations.
As more surveillance was added to suburban stations, the IRA was forced to
shift its bombs again, this time down the tracks, away from the stations, which
reduced potential casualties. While the London model won’t necessarily
prevent a suicide bomber, it clearly raises the bar for entry-level terrorists.
London is not the only model we can learn from. Paris has a similar system.
One difference is that the French are willing to flood the transit system with
gendarmes and military troops who have little concern for individual rights.
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“Under French democracy, the arm of the state quickly becomes the fist of the
law.”
Based on the terrorist threat alone, it may be hard to justify installing elaborate
security systems like these in the United States. Even if the likelihood of a
major attack on transit somewhere in the United States is high, the probability
of an attack on a given transit system or particular station is remote. That’s
where citing the side-benefits of reducing crime, making riders feel safer, or
cutting down on graffiti can help. Another cost factor to consider, Jenkins
noted, is that it is far more expensive to deploy a London-style system in an
older infrastructure, like New York, “where you have girders every 15 feet,
requiring 150 cameras per station.” It is much cheaper to build security in
when a new system is designed.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT
I am with Caltrans and work on the Bay Area Security Enhancements Team,
which is putting up approximately 250 cameras on tunnels and bridges. Would
you please address the civil liberties implications of using cameras? What
about the use of biometrics, such as retinal scans?
BRIAN JENKINS
Television monitoring of public areas is not an invasion of privacy. There are
other possible issues, such as TV monitoring of public rest rooms, but no civil
liberties questions. A television camera is no different than a cop on a beat. It’s
just another pair of eyes watching. In terms of biometrics, there is no question
that we are headed in that direction. We will increasingly apply biometrics to
the normal ID things we carry anyway, such as driver’s licenses. We could end
up with a national identity card, but I do not advocate linking up 5,000
databases so one card accesses medical records, social security information
and your credit rating. You are basically only interested in three things in a
national ID card…
ROD DIRIDON
(completes Jenkins answer)…Only three things: (1) Who you are—you’re not
someone pretending to be someone else—it’s you; (2) You are here in the U.S.
legally; and (3) You are not, at the moment, being sought as a terrorist or
dangerous fugitive. A national ID card should not be used to make people pay
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traffic tickets or child support payments. National ID should be a separate
system—don’t link databases. My nine years experience with a private
investigative company taught me that many databases are riddled with
inaccuracies.
Absent an official national ID card, Diridon recommends establishing a
national biometrically-based standard for the current surrogate national ID, a
state-issued driver’s license. Another alternative is the “Trusted Traveler”
approach, with frequent travelers voluntarily providing identity information
(including biometrics) to a database, allowing them to be fast-tracked through
(but not exempted from) security checkpoints. Trusted Traveler is already
being tested at European airports; it could be extended to surface
transportation. If we create a biometrically confirmed Trusted Traveler card
with photo ID, it will become a surrogate national ID. We will use it for
everything from financial transactions to boarding airplanes. Trusted Traveler
will probably use thumbprints or hand scans, rather than cumbersome to
administer iris scans. (By the way, facial recognition technology that can
identify a target’s face in a crowd at the Super Bowl is probably a long way
off.)
LARRY GERSTON
I agree with Brian that cameras in public places do not raise a civil liberties
issue; however, I have some reservations about the National ID card issue.
First, there are some detection technologies, such as Orlando airport’s body
scans, which display a revealing whole body outline to scanners. This does
raise serious privacy issues. There is an inherent tension between maximum
freedom and maximum security. There will almost certainly be a serious
debate about a National ID card—and there should be. However I predict that
the frequency and severity of future terrorist attacks, rather than logical
argument will determine the outcome of this debate.
I also question whether any National ID can be restricted to 3-5 pieces of
information. There are smart people out there with the ability to evade
protection protocols and merge databases. We need to expect unintended
negative consequences. Quite frankly, technology is moving much faster than
our ability to understand it, so I anticipate we will be talking a lot about civil
liberties issues for years to come.
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ROD DIRIDON
As it often happens at meetings like this, the Q & A period tends to pass
without questions directed to the Disaster Response Expert. Yet, in the event of
an attempted terrorist attack, “recovery” is more likely than “preventing.” So
I’d like to ask Sandy to make a closing comment.
SANDY COVALL-ALVES
The one thing I’d like to stress about what we learned in Washington and New
York on 9/11, is that disasters are local. So when you go back home, make sure
your house is in order—that you have access to all the local numbers and
contacts you need. When something happens, it happens at the local level.
FEMA alone won’t be able to save us.
WES LUM
In terms of County Disaster Planning Operations, how do you insure that all
the appropriate players are included in discussions about planning and strategy,
as well as recovery and response?
SANDY COVALL-ALVES
Speaking for Sonoma County (where I work), we coordinate via two groups,
our Emergency Coordinator’s Forum and our Emergency Council. Both
organizations have broad representation from all types of agencies, including
transportation—especially the Coordinator’s Forum, which meets quarterly to
discuss better ways to do response, recovery and mitigation. However, every
county has its own unique forum for coordinating and nobody is perfect. So
look around at the agencies represented here. If you identify a type of agency
you are not in contact with, back in your city or county, take it upon yourself to
establish contact when you go home. If you represent an agency that is not
included in the planning process back home, demand a seat at the table.
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LOS ANGELES SUMMIT SESSION, MARCH 29, 2002
DAN COWDEN, MTA
Some terrorist actions have been thwarted in the past. Do we have enough data
about incidents to identify any meaningful trends? What are some of the things
that have been successful in thwarting attacks?
ROD DIRIDON
With respect to the available data there are some significant analytical
problems. First, it is very hard to count events that don’t occur. We do not
know how many attacks have been thwarted. We are limited to analyzing the
smaller universe of incidents that we knew were planned and didn’t happen.
Terrorists are constantly planning attacks; only some plans are implemented.
“Even when we have good intelligence sources inside the terrorist
organization, they are constantly reporting back that terrorists are talking about
this or that, or contemplating doing these other things.” This creates a high
volume of noise. “It is hard to somehow connect the dots to make sense of it
all.”
In some cases we have clear evidence that a planned attack has been prevented,
such as planned attacks in New York City after the 1993 WTC bombing or the
thwarted attempt by domestic terrorists to carry out attacks on propane farms
in California.
How have attacks been thwarted? In some cases, it is intelligence. When
intelligence is precise (such as captured documents or videotapes) it allows for
the arrest of individuals. Even if the intelligence is imprecise, it may allow for
countermeasures sufficient to thwart or postpone an attack, such as closing an
embassy or stepping up security. We also know from interrogations of captured
terrorists that physical security sometimes thwarts attacks. However, physical
security by itself cannot prevent terrorism. If you protect one set of targets, you
are only “pushing the threat around” to another, less secure, target.

Mineta Transportation Institute

Summarized Questions & Answers for Morning Panels

43

BRIAN JENKINS
Let me underscore Rod’s point about pushing the threat around. Physical
security only displaces the risk; it won’t end the threat. When the NY Port
Authority asked us, after the World Trade Center bombing in ‘93, “how much
security is enough?”, I said, half jokingly,”We have to get enough security so
the next bomb will be across the street at the World Financial Center. That’s
somebody else’s property.” The World Financial Center heard about that,
actually, and invited us to come and look at their facility. It turned out to be a
terrific marketing tool.
With the right kind of training, alert individuals can prevent an attack. For
example, an alert customs agent on the Canadian border asked a traveler a
question and her instincts told her something was not right with his answer. So
she asked a second question and a third…until the nervous would-be terrorist
took off running. Some Puerto Rican terrorists were captured in Chicago
because a passerby thought it was suspicious to see people wearing jogging
clothes smoking and called authorities. The British public is so alert to possible
terrorist attacks, that British authorities are confident they will be notified
about suspicious happenings within two or three minutes. So we do want to
educate the public, although we should anticipate cranks calling up to tell us
“My neighbor is a spy for Saddam Hussein.”
Finally, you sometimes end up with spontaneous public intervention, as
demonstrated in the Richard Reed shoe bomb case. “Probably the greatest
improvement in security on airplanes since 9/11 is the fact that any would-be
terrorist will be beaten senseless by terrified passengers.”
PAMELA MURANO, LOS ANGELES MTA
Aside from intelligence, I would think a primary indicator of a possible
terrorist attack would be the purchase of instruments or tools for the attack. Do
we have sufficient controls and reporting requirements in place for chemicals?
I know the gentleman they picked up in Las Vegas with anthrax had apparently
ordered botulism from the Centers for Disease Control—and CDC mailed it to
him. I am wondering, 1) if there are reporting requirements and, 2) if there is
an adequate inventory kept for chemicals and biomaterials?
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BRIAN JENKINS
For explosives, probably not—especially ammonium nitrate fertilizers and
diesel fuel. Hundreds of million of tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer are used
in agriculture in this country every year. There are no controls on the purchase
of fertilizer and other potential explosives or incendiaries that have ordinary
commercial uses. One would hope, however, that suppliers would tip off
authorities if a stranger pulled up in a rental truck and ordered several tons of
fertilizer (or that flying school instructors would inform on students who were
not interested in takeoffs or landings.)
There are some controls for chemical and biological materials, but they are
completely inadequate. The National Commission on Terrorism has
recommended increasing controls on certain types of chemicals—and even
more importantly—certain types of pathogens. As we discovered during last
September’s anthrax investigation, lots of people have access to anthrax spores
with little in the way of record keeping. Controls are completely inept.
FRANCES EDWARDS-WINSLOW
Let me share my own experience with hazardous material control at the local
government level. It is cheap and easy to get access to all kinds of hazardous
materials and relatively easy—with a modest amount of knowledge—to
construct effective terrorist weapons in your home. I know, from conducting
on-site inspections for my city, that undocumented strangers can walk into
facilities and gain easy access to hazardous materials without being
challenged. I even know of a company that repackages hazardous materials
shipped in bulk on railcars that keeps no records whatsoever on people who
purchase small packages of hazardous materials that fall below the legal
threshold requiring controls.
With respect to laboratory materials, university labs are open to virtually
anyone at all. Graduate students have keys; they work nights and weekends,
bringing undocumented friends along to keep them company. UCI’s labs in the
city of Irvine were my greatest nightmare. Graduate students were creating
polymers that never existed before. My HazMat team would have had no idea
how to respond to an unknown substance. How careful are students when they
dispose of these experimental materials?
I worked in a hospital lab myself for four years, and I can tell you that hospitals
also have no security. In fact, there are a number of documented cases where
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hospital employees obtained pathogens from the lab where they worked and
used them on people. In one Oregon case, two nurses filled spray bottles with
pathogens and visited local salad bar restaurants as part of a scheme to sway
the outcome of an election. They made over 700 people sick; 400 sought
medical care. “How hard was that? Not at all.”
Strangers can actually obtain dangerous biological materials from universities
or hospitals by mail. I know of two FBI agents who took university fundraising letters from a dumpster to obtain letterhead and then wrote officiallooking letters addressed to “Dear Culture Collection Person.”
My partner has 10 years in the Marine Corps. One evening he and I went down
to Orchard Supply and bought a shopping basket with $79 worth of stuff. We
used it to construct 19 explosive devices. We bought pipe pieces, plastics,
nails, wire, all kinds of stuff. But to the average clerk that doesn’t mean
anything. What can we do to protect transit agencies from these threats?
Maybe we provide more intensive training. If someone brings in an oddlooking package, maybe the operator should feel comfortable in saying,
“Excuse me sir, you can’t bring that on.” But what about the lady with 17
shopping bags? Would you stop a shoebox from coming on a bus?
MIKE WEISS, AMTRAK INSPECTOR GENERAL’S OFFICE
(to Brian Jenkins) We’ve seen lots of money spent on elaborate security
systems. No disrespect here, but nobody checked my ID coming in here and
I’m armed. People obviously get complacent. What is an effective way to
provide oversight for a security system after it’s set up?
BRIAN JENKINS
We can make near-perfect machines, but God does not make perfect people.
Most lapses are not technological failures; they are performance failures.
Magnetometers don’t work well if you don’t plug them in. What can be done?
First, we need more rigorous testing of these systems under realistic
conditions. The only way to maintain high performance is to constantly test. It
is easy to poke fun at screeners, but this is an extraordinarily tough job. It can
be mind-numbing in terms of the boredom it causes.
In the past, when testing was unrealistic, performance rates were artificially
high. With more rigorous testing, the scores will actually go down, but that’s
all right. The perpetrator is making calculations too. A detection score of 70
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percent may be unacceptable in a certain sense. But it still has a deterrent
effect. Would you take on a mission with only a 30 percent chance of success?
Also, as we step up testing we should take care to avoid making these systems
the object of public scrutiny and criticism. The illusion of security is an
important deterrent. I am in favor of having a lot of visible systems to keep
potential terrorists in mystery about the probability of being caught.
We also need to upgrade the job of screening. Creating a federal service would
be useful, because it creates the possibility of a national profession, with
possibilities of promotion, accumulation of points, even inter-airport, interteam competitions. If screeners fail to find contraband, they need more
training. If they do a good job, reward them. “Let’s put a medal on the best
guy’s pockets. Let’s put chevrons on their sleeves. Let’s really turn it into
something where people are going to want to take pride in their performance,
instead of a crummy job with low pay.”
DAN JARVIS, L.A. COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT AND CHIEF
OF POLICE SERVICES, ORANGE COUNTY TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY
These discussions have been quite frank; the press is excluded. How do we, as
safety and security providers, make use of this information for public
presentations, without creating public hysteria—or to justify our fiscal and
staffing needs at hearings open to the public?
ROD DIRIDON
We have kept these discussions closed because we want to speak freely, not
because we are sharing national secrets. We also want to avoid having specific
comments publicized out of context. Having the media here would just inhibit
discussion. We will probably publish the essence of these sessions in a public
document, without including all the colorful detail. You can describe the
threats, concerns and issues in the public domain. Just leave off some of the
details, on either the threat side or the security side.
BRIAN JENKINS
Sometimes I think that we experts are all bureaucrats in one way or another.
We think our job is to implement what we know. And there is a lot of truth in
that. In addition to implementing what we know, we also have a responsibility

Mineta Transportation Institute

Summarized Questions & Answers for Morning Panels

47

to use our expertise to participate in the public dialogue, to work in concert
with others to make sure that people are aware of the issues.
LARRY GERSTON
Brian has a point. We can’t go around talking about things people don’t need to
know, but there are plenty of threat situations out there that call for a response
from the experts: Bridges that need to be protected better, waterways that need
to be protected better. I was driving to San Jose Airport this morning and saw
all those massive jets, just thirty feet away, on the other side of this dinky little
fence. We can’t all be vigilantes about this, although we can certainly write our
members of Congress and others. But through organizations like those
represented here, we can make comments, we can make statements, we can
make demands. If the people who know something about the problem don’t
speak up, who will?
FRANCES EDWARDS-WINSLOW
As someone who has had to justify a request for money at a televised city
council meeting, I am familiar with this issue. One thing that helped me a lot,
was our city attorney’s ruling that the Brown Act did not apply to sensitive
security information. So I scheduled a closed session with the city council,
where I could share confidential details and answer all their questions in a
secure environment. Then, in my legally required public presentation on my
budget, I substituted examples from 9/11 already known to the public, rather
than reveal sensitive information about our local security situation. If any of
you are in a similar position, I’d be happy to share my generic PowerPoint
presentation, which may give you some ideas of how to walk the delicate line
between the public’s need to know and avoiding the disclosure of sensitive
information.
ERIC POLKA, FTA, LOS ANGELES METROPOLITAN OFFICE
This morning you talked about needing unique solutions for every situation,
and mentioned the example of having representatives of MTA, Amtrak,
commuter rail, subways, tunnels and buses all working together in one facility.
You were talking about New York, but at first I thought you were talking about
the MTA, right here in Union Station. There are obviously similarities with
respect to inter-organizational cooperation in these two cities. Can you
comment on what we can do in L.A. to take advantage of this synergy?
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ROD DIRIDON
My only response is that, first of all, Los Angeles County is probably
exemplary. There are few places in the country that are ahead of L.A. in terms
of bringing all the agencies, departments, and various operators together in the
same room. One reason, clearly, is that we’ve had all kinds of disasters here in
Southern California, so we have to put things together. What we can do to take
advantage of the potential for synergy is to “exercise, exercise, exercise.” Use
tabletop exercises, drills, and simulations. This is especially important in an
area like L.A., where you have such complex interaction among many
jurisdictions and modes of transportation.
BRIAN JENKINS
One other thing, and this is a real issue for governance in America. We tend to
react to new problems with turf wars over which group will be in control. I
know you can’t turn an aircraft carrier around on a dime. But as we face the
crisis of America’s 87,000 federal, state and local governments having to get
along like they’ve never done before, it’s the crisis of 9/11 that will be
responsible for ending the bureaucratic battles. Sooner or later, the various
agencies that fight for turf will have to come to terms. It may take state or
federal legislation, but we no longer have the luxury of every agency dancing
to its own tune.
ROD DIRIDON
Let me add one admonition. Our biggest enemy is not Al-Qaida. It is
complacency. Nothing has happened for a while, and we are slipping back into
a sense of false security. Six months from now you are going to have a hard
time getting funding for your programs or attention from your policy leaders
for possible threats that absolutely require a response. So you need to convince
your policy leaders about the seriousness of the issues we face. We did invite
policy leaders to this session; there are a couple here. But most of them sent
you, the security leadership people. It will be up to you to remind your policy
leadership people that the threat has not gone away; “The threat situation could
actually be more serious, because we now have a more cautious, more
educated adversary.”
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS: ELLEN G. ENGLEMAN
Administrator Engleman characterized the September 11th attack on the World
Trade Center as an attack on America’s “cherished freedom of mobility” and
therefore a threat to economic prosperity as well as security. Citing lessons
learned from the way transportation employees and organizations responded
on 9/11, she underscored the crucial role advance training played in reducing
casualties. Engleman therefore urged a strategic response that emphasized
even more training, as well as the development and deployment of advanced
technology. Engleman also believes that the elevated threat of terrorist attacks
requires significant organizational changes all levels of government, some of
which are already underway. Foremost among these changes is the need to
significantly improve cross-jurisdictional cooperation and coordination before,
during, and after an emergency.
Transportation Vital to U.S. Economy
Acknowledging that any security measures must be consistent with the need
for both safety and personal freedom, Engleman pointed to the central role of
transportation in the U.S. economy. She reiterated President Bush’s State of the
Union goals (winning the war at home and abroad, protecting our homeland,
and reviving our economy), citing U.S. Transportation Secretary Norman
Mineta’s Congressional testimony that linked achieving these three goals to the
protection, maintenance, and expansion of America’s transportation system. To
illustrate the economic importance of transportation, Engleman described the
mission of the Office of Pipeline Safety (part of her own agency), which is
responsible for monitoring the nation’s 2.2 million miles of oil and natural gas
pipelines—“the economic backbone of this nation.”
Prior Training Saves Lives
The response to 9/11 by transportation organizations and employees proves
that advance training saves lives. As one example, Engleman cited the
effective response of Federal Transit Agency (FTA) and New York City Transit
employees stationed in the metro station beneath the WTC. Training exercises
for a variety of emergencies had proved that even low level transit employees
must be given the authority to make on-the-spot decisions. “So when the tower
was hit, the station manager…did not call up the chain of command.” Instead,
he pulled out a card in his shirt pocket and followed emergency instructions.
As a result of his action and the actions of other employees, “tens of thousands
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of lives were saved.” Engleman also praised the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority, the U. S. Coast Guard, and U.S. DOT’s own staff for
using what they had learned in training exercises to save thousands of lives at
risk on 9/11.
No Technological Silver Bullet
No single technological “silver bullet” can assure transportation security,
Engleman warned; instead, we need a broad approach using “whatever
technology is out there.” When RSPA put out a call for new ideas just two
weeks after September 11, industry responded with more than 600 white
papers, proposing new security technology than ranged from “the most exotic
biometrics to the most basic advanced materials applications.”
Organizational Changes
Engleman noted that the Administration and Congress had already created the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within U.S. DOT prior to 9/11.
TSA’s mission is to improve security for rail, highways, transit, maritime,
pipeline, and containers as well as at our borders and ports. Within days of the
9/11, Secretary Mineta created an additional organization, the National
Infrastructure Security Committee (NISC), which has six Direct Action
Groups (DAGs), each assigned to a specific mode of transportation. Each
DAG is working closely with industry representatives to develop specific
recommendations to enhance security for their particular mode. Engleman also
discussed the operations of RSPA’s Crisis Management Center (CMC), which
has been in continuous operation since September 11.
Improving Cross-Jurisdictional Coordination
RSPA’s administrator stressed the need for improved coordination and
communication, saying that even though there are operational jurisdictional
issues “Safety has no jurisdiction…” She went on to emphasize that, “We’re all
in this together. If something happens, the American public doesn’t care which
agency or alphabet soup committee was supposedly in charge, because we are
all responsible.” Engleman concluded by noting that the U.S. transportation
community must expand its traditional definition of safety to encompass
security, because “Security is a subset of safety.” Quoting Coast Guard
Commandant Admiral Loy’s dictum that “Preparation equals performance,”
she observed that key to responding to the challenges ahead is “training,
planning, preparation.”
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AFTERNOON PANEL: “SELECTED NATIONAL SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION AND DISASTER RESPONSE
TRAINING PROGRAMS”
The panel was introduced by former U.S. DOT Deputy Secretary Mort
Downey, who currently serves as principal consultant for advanced
transportation technology programs at pbConsult, a unit of Parsons
Brinkerhoff. Other presenters were: Dr. Sherrie Anderson, program manager
for the Office of Intelligence and Security at U.S. DOT; Steve Vaughn, deputy
chief of intelligence and security for CHP; Nancy Houston, a senior associate
with Booz Allen Hamilton; and Greg Hull, director of operations security and
safety for APTA.
MORT DOWNEY: OVERVIEW OF SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
Downey framed the afternoon panel discussions as a description of possible
organizational, technological, and training responses to the terrorist threat
described by the morning panel. For Downey, the morning session could be
summed up by two paragraphs from the 1999 book Preventive Defense, coauthored by Ashe Carter of the Kennedy School and Bill Perry, former Clinton
Secretary of Defense:
Someday, in the not too distant future, Americans will be attacked with
deadly agents, just as the Japanese were in the infamous Tokyo subway
attacks. We do not know when the first attack on U.S. soil will take place.
And we do not know where. But like the attack on Pearl Harbor, an
incident of catastrophic terrorism will divide our past and our future into
before and after.
Today we are in the “after” period—when our efforts to respond to terrorism
reflect the wisdom of hindsight. “Additional terrorist acts are being planned,”
Downey warned, “So we need to be able to respond.” One factor that will help
us respond, he observed, is that public confidence in government has “not been
this high since the Kennedy Administration.” Downey therefore urged
government at all levels to take advantage of this support to secure additional
resources for the anti-terrorism fight.
One reason to step up our response, Downey observed, is that the negative
effects 9/11 on the U.S. economy (described by Dr. Gerston in the morning

Mineta Transportation Institute

52

Afternoon Panel: Selected National Surface Security & Disaster Response Traning Programs

session) are likely to get worse. For example, excess liability insurance
premiums for the airline industry have jumped from $50 million per year to
$950 million per year. “You are going to see that in your airfares,” Downey
warned, “You are going to see that in shaky finances for airlines.” Sharply
higher insurance costs are likely to impact other modes of transportation as
well. Rating agencies and bankers are going to protect their transportation
investments, Downey asserted, by demanding that operators make significant
additional investments in security. The insurance consequences of future
attacks could cripple entire industries. What would happen, Downey
speculated, following a WTC-level event involving a freight container with a
weapon of mass destruction inside?
If we decided to bring the freight system to a halt to check all containers, it
would take about 50 days to check the containers that come in one day. At
that point, we are 50 days behind in delivering the goods to run the national
economy. That’s not going to work.
Budgetary Implications
Downey told his audience to expect a severe economic impact from 9/11 on
their own agency budgets as well. Washington can print money, he noted, “But
state and local governments can’t. They’re going to have to squeeze this new
priority in, among everything else.” He also cautioned listeners about the
potential revenue consequences of terrorism for transportation, noting that the
“shadow of terrorism” kept ridership down on the Paris subway system for
years. When requesting additional funds, Downey advised making the
argument that paying for preparedness now is a lot cheaper than paying for
recovery later. Downey also suggested emphasizing that investments in transit
security can potentially improve operations. Investing in tracking systems for
cargo containers, for example, “will, in fact, be efficiency measures…that will
pay off in the long run.”
Good Communications
One security investment with a particularly high payoff is better
communications. “Communications adequate to handle a terrorist incident,”
Downey said, “are going to be useful every day in dealing with the kinds of
things that happen every day in our transportation world.” These events
include fire fighting, evacuations during a natural disaster, and securing
stations and facilities as a deterrent to crime.
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Response Capability
Downey defined “doctrine and protocol” (working out the specifics of what to
do under very specific conditions and training to implement these plans) as “a
critical part of responding.” He cited evacuation as an example of the need for
a planned response: “When do we evacuate? When do we move trains, if
there’s been an explosion or a chemical attack? How do we use the ventilation
system in our subways? To bring air in to fight a fire or bring air out to fight a
fire? Do we bring air in if we have had a chemical attack or do we flush air
out? “We need to know, we need to respond instantly, and we need to have our
people trained to react appropriately.”
Evacuation Plans
While on the subject of evacuation, Downey commended Washington D.C.’s
metro system for doing a “terrific job” getting frightened people out of town on
9/11—and worrying later about how people would get to a preferred final
destination. Metro told passengers “we’ll get you out of town.” Meanwhile
Metro rerouted buses to suburban stations in order to transport passengers to
shopping malls where families could pick them up later. Downey believes that
America’s cities should benefit from Washington’s experience and develop
their own well-thought out evacuation capability, which can be used “not just
for terrorism, but for hurricanes.”
Technology
Shifting to the subject of technology and terrorism, Downey asserted that we
don’t need, “another widget to make things more complicated.” Instead, we
should be asking operators and security people how new technologies (like
biometrics or sensors) might make the system safer and more secure. What we
need, he insisted, is a public-private partnership that makes use of the best
available knowledge and expertise in or out of government. What would be
especially helpful, Downey believes, are technological innovations that “allow
us to pre-screen people and goods to manage them appropriately.”
Training
We also need to make better use of technology to improve training. Even
though training is already one of America’s greatest assets for dealing with
terrorism, more is required. As an example of linking technology with training,
Downey described a new use for a mountain tunnel in West Virginia that had
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been constructed for an interstate highway that was never completed. This
tunnel had been already been converted into a highway design test bed to study
airflow, fire, and emergency use. Now it is being used as a national response
facility to train personnel to deal with such emergency situations as tunnel fires
and crashes under real world conditions. The facility is now being upgraded to
add an underground subway station where training exercises can be conducted.
SHERRIE ANDERSON: REVIEW OF LAND TRANSPORTATION
TERRORISM TRAINING PROGRAMS
When Anderson’s agency—U.S. DOT’s Office of Intelligence and Security—
was created in response to the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland in 1990, its initial focus was naturally on airline security. Anderson
joined the office (which then employed just 16 people) in 1991, with
instructions to add land transportation security to her agency’s portfolio. Her
assignment was to develop a comprehensive land security program that
included transit buses, inter-city motor coaches, rail (both passenger and
freight) and cargo security. Concern for land transportation security, Anderson
acknowledged, still lags far behind the priority given to airline security. Land
transportation, for example, has yet to implement even a modest version of the
kind of mandated security check-in procedures long required at America’s
airports. Although this policy could change dramatically down the road,
Anderson emphasized that land transportation security policy remains in flux.
Land Transportation as a Terrorist Target
Anderson reported the results of a 1998 research study, conducted by her office
that emphasized the possibility of terrorists targeting land transportation. The
vulnerability of transportation was very clearly demonstrated on 9/11—and by
the earlier foiled plots against New York bridges and tunnels. Land
transportation is a “soft target,” the more so because so much effort is being
expended to strengthen aviation security. As Anderson put it, land
transportation is vulnerable because,
... it’s open and we invite people in to use our system. It’s user-friendly. It’s
an attractive target because we have millions of people going through the
system daily. And it would be a mass disruption and destruction if terrorists
were able to penetrate our system. So we must work hard to prevent it from
happening.
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Anderson is worried that before transportation security procedures come up to
speed, the nation may yet slip back into complacency. She cited her own
experience, prior to 9/11, trying to convince colleagues and partners within
U.S. DOT that “security is just as important as safety.” Anderson is convinced
that land transportation security is vital to the nation’s defense. She reminded
her listeners that America remains at war: “We know the terrorists train, and
train—and train some more…we know they can get driver’s licenses…they
know our system better than we do.”
Security Training Saves Lives
Anderson reiterated the recurring conference theme that “training saves lives,”
citing two specific land transportation cases. One involved MTA police
officers in NY, whose security training had enabled them to foil a terrorist plot
to blow up the city’s subway system in 1997. In another incident, a
maintenance worker’s security training enabled him to detect an explosive
device in a trash receptacle at New York’s Grand Central terminal. This second
example underscores the need to train all surface transportation employees in
security awareness.
Anderson contrasted these reassuring instances in which training surface
transportation employees saved lives, with the Sarin nerve agent attack on
Tokyo’s subway, where lack of training (and a reluctance to challenge normal
operating procedures) increased the number of casualties. Conforming to an
ill-conceived commitment to stay in operation even though they knew
something was seriously amiss, subway personnel kept trains containing lethal
sarin moving back and forth through the system for several hours. A clean-up
crew committed to pristine floors no matter what, actually swept up the Sarin
debris, spreading the impact of the toxic agent. However, even in the Tokyo
incident, a security-trained maintenance worker (who discovered an additional
device planted in a washroom) was able to prevent a second incident from
occurring.
Training is particularly important, in Anderson’s view, when new security
technology is being introduced. Very high technology is being introduced at
U.S. airports (explosive detection technology, x-ray machines), “but these
people really don’t know how to operate them.” She confessed to a similar
oversight on her own part, back in the 1980’s, while traveling overseas for
DOD to arrange for installation of new security equipment. “We forgot the
most important element: training the person who would be monitoring.”
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LAND TRANSPORTATION ANTI-TERRORISM TRAINING
PROGRAM (LTAP)
With the case for training underlined by these examples, Anderson then
discussed the Land Transportation Anti-Terrorism Training Program (LTAP)
jointly developed by her office and the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center (FLETC) in Glenco, Georgia. LTAP, she said, was a response to the
“outcry of law enforcement and security officials that there was a need.”
Similar pleas had been made by the transportation industry.
The decision to partner with FLETC represented a commitment to avoid
duplication of effort. U.S. DOT also approached FLETC because the center
was already providing some anti-terrorism training for 70 federal agencies, and
thus had practical experience in this area. Finally, establishing LTAP at FLETC
leveraged the impact of the course, by allowing counties to purchase training
for their employees with non-designated federal funds, rather than relying on
DOT’s limited funding.
To develop the new LTAP course, U.S. DOT also consulted with the
Transportation Safety Institute and the National Transit Institute. “Partnering is
very important,” Anderson noted, “not just with other federal agencies, but
also with state and local officials.” Reflecting this commitment to partnering,
U.S. DOT held a curriculum development conference (funded, in part, by the
National Institute of Justice) inviting representatives from the railroad and
transit industries, as well as FLETC, AMTRAK, and U.S. DOT’s Operating
Administration. Some California agencies (MTA, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Department) also participated.
Local Law Enforcement and Security—First Line of Defense
While U.S. DOT wants to promote safety and security, it does not directly
operate transit systems. That’s why LTAP targets law enforcement and security
officials, who actually do work on or near surface transportation systems:
“They are our first line of defense…the one’s we refer to as our first
responders.” While the course was developed for law enforcement and security
personnel, other transportation personnel also participate in LTAP, including
general managers, senior officials, and budget officers. Budget officials are
particularly important because, prior to 9/11, they had very little awareness of
the severity of the terrorist threat—and of the need for more funding. As
Anderson put it, we can use the budget to “pay up front—or pay later.”
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LTAP Course Instructors
The LTAP course was “fully up and running” in 1999, and by 2000, the
program had lined up high quality instructors drawn from many agencies:
•

FBI—usually from the local FBI office

•

CIA

•

Department of Energy and Argon Labs—research on chemical detection
and biological agents

•

U.S. DOT’s Office of Intelligence and Security–provides an intelligence
analyst who gives the threat overview

•

FLETC staff officers–bomb squad

•

The Modis System in Atlanta–covered special event planning for the 1996
Atlanta Olympics

•

The NYPD transit bureau

Course of Instruction
Anderson briefly went over the course curriculum, which uses a case-study
method, based on actual incidents. (At the Los Angeles session, Anderson
underscored the importance of using bomb-threat examples, given how
frequently threats occur.) The course material stresses “dual-use,” the fact that
protecting transit customers from routine criminal acts (like pick-pocketing) by
deploying highly visible patrols and security cameras also deters terrorist acts.
Anderson cited her early experience as a Department of Defense physical
security specialist, where she learned to focus on “the little things” that keep a
system or facility safe—“good training, procedural security, the whole
process.”
Contingency Planning
Being prepared means having a plan. What should be in a contingency plan?
Who do we communicate with? What is our role? Who’s in charge? What
phone numbers do we need to have on hand? Have we been coordinating with
the right people? Are we in touch with the FBI? This phase of the course also
discusses crisis and post-crisis management and the “incident command
system”—all the critical areas for recovery after an incident happens. As part
of the contingency plan unit, participants are given a current threat overview
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and a segment on media relations, emphasizing the need to develop a good
working relationship with the media in advance of an incident. Anderson
emphasized that simply having a good plan was not enough; you need to take
that plan and “Train, train, train, and train some more.”
Physical Security Overview
This phase of the curriculum involves identifying vulnerabilities and what to
do about them. One approach is to piggy-back on the concept of Crime
Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) by security concerns.
“CPTED gives you the principles and techniques you need to develop a robust
security program,” says Anderson, who cited the example of cutting hedges
around windows to deter entry by thieves in order to also deter terrorists from
planting a bomb in that location. The basic point, she says, is to design security
in, whenever you are planning a new facility or retrofitting an existing one.
Transportation System Vulnerabilities
“We all know that our systems are vulnerable,” Anderson said, “but how
vulnerable are they—and which vulnerabilities can be managed?” To deal with
these issues, course participants are trained to recognize pre-incident
indicators, such as target surveillance. It is well known that terrorists spend
years surveying potential targets. “If you see someone sitting across the street,
taking pictures…you might want to report that.” As part of the course, students
also study actual incidents, both in the U.S. and overseas. One extra benefit of
this segment is that it helps trainees return to their agencies with a better
understanding of how to plan special events, such as an IMF or World Bank
meeting.
Weapons of mass destruction, of course, are of particular concern. The threat
of nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological events are covered in the
course, as well as how to manage and respond to them.
The final phase of the four and one-half day course is an integrated practical
exercise in which participants practice the new skills they have learned.
Anderson Requests Continued Support for LTAP
While there is a demonstrated need for the LTAP course, it is not free; tuition
can range from $300 to $700, depending on where the course is offered and
whether instructor travel expenses are included. Presenters do not receive a
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salary. Anderson concluded her remarks by appealing to her audience for
continued support of the LTAP program. “Right now, four courses are being
offered yearly. We are hoping, if there is a need, to increase that number to five
courses, and if we get responses from you, in terms of need, that will give me
momentum to ask for more funding.”
STEVE VAUGHN: SECURITY OF CALIFORNIA’S
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
California Highway Patrol (CHP) Deputy Chief Steve Vaughn detailed the
State of California’s efforts to protect the security of transportation
infrastructure, post-9/11. In Vaughn’s opinion, California “is light-years ahead”
of many other states in terms of emergency response planning and the
California Highway Patrol (CHP) plays a significant role in carrying out these
plans. CHP is responsible for patrolling 104,000 miles of roadway and
provides security for 240 state agencies, including 4,450 state facilities.
California Governor Davis has also tasked CHP with assisting local police and
other state agencies in providing additional security for 1,391 dams and more
than 660 miles of aqueduct. This adds up to a formidable challenge for CHP’s
relatively small force of 7,000 officers.
Immediate Response to 9/11
Within hours of 9/11, Governor Davis and key members of his cabinet had
been swiftly relocated (according to plan) to the pre-designated California state
emergency center at the CHP academy. Upon arrival, one of the governor’s
first actions was to create a task force to protect California’s infrastructure. The
task force was asked to identify possible transportation targets and come up
with a long-range plan to protect them. The task force’s first concern was to
determine which structures were most critical to protecting citizens and
keeping the economy going—and which of these structures were most
vulnerable.
Designating Critical Structures
At the end of its evaluation process, the task force designated sixteen of the
most critical transportation facilities in the state as Priority One targets. This
short list includes major toll road bridges and bridges controlling access to
ports essential to the defense and economy of California. (Vaughn explained
that the definition of “critical” included high-profile symbolic targets like the
Golden Gate Bridge and the San Francisco Bay Bridge—not absolutely vital in
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the economic or security sense, but absolutely necessary to defend because of
their political significance).
Priority Two targets include bridges and interchanges serving California’s
Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET), the critical transportation network
serving California’s large number of military bases, ports and defense
installations, as well as additional roads and bridges vital to the state’s
economy. A total of 4,287 structures were initially designated as Priority Two,
however, facilities that could be easily repaired and put back into service were
later reassigned a lower priority. The final adjusted Priority Two list designated
1,233 structures as critical, including bridges, tunnels, and interchanges. These
installations were chosen in part, because they would be needed as evacuation
routes during a mass emergency. “As many of you are aware,” Vaughn stated,
“we have contingency plans, such as those for earthquakes, that require us to
eliminate freeway traffic in one direction in order to turn the highway into a
one-way evacuation route.”
Priority Three targets were bridges that happen to cross over, (but are not part
of) STRAHNET highways. “Obviously, if these bridges come down on top of
a STRAHNET highway, they’ve interrupted the STRAHNET flow.” Priority
Four targets were bridges on the U.S. national highway system that are,
nonetheless, not part of STRAHNET. Priority Five includes bridges not in
categories 1-4, but which, nonetheless, cross over interstate highways.
Survey Teams
Once priority structures had been identified, the next step was to have the eight
regional CHP field divisions send out survey teams to take an on-site look at
structures in their respective areas of responsibility. All 4,200 plus structures
initially identified as Priority Two targets were examined. Vaughn provided
each field division with a list of possible survey team candidates. Suggested
team members included experts from the California and U.S. Departments of
Transportation, the U.S. Coast Guard (because they work with bridges and
waterways), and military explosive ordinance personnel. “I thought, if you are
going to take down a bridge,” said Vaughn, “Who is going to do it? People
with explosives. And who better to ask about probable terrorist techniques than
a team of Navy Seals?” The suggested list of team members also included state
engineers from Caltrans, researchers from the Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory, as well as experts from the State Office of Emergency Services and
the Federal Highway Administration.
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Each team started out by looking for the obvious: blind spots, lack of outdoor
lighting, unlocked doors, and whether or not structures were fenced off. “We
looked for ‘No Trespassing’ signs—not because they would stop people from
entering—but because passers-by would be more likely to call the police if
they saw suspicious activity.”
(Increased public awareness, says Vaughn, is a good thing. “We are getting
calls from motorists about people stopped near fences or taking pictures.” But,
Vaughn added, post-9/11, “We are also getting calls every time some tourist
wants to photograph the Golden Gate Bridge.”)
Survey Recommendations
The initial district surveys led to immediate changes in security procedures at
many sites. Most modifications were simple, such as adding guards, locking
doors, or installing security fences and lighting. However, Vaughn noted, other
suggestions (such as installation of video monitors, pressure sensitive
switches, motion sensors, intrusion alerts, contact alarms, glass breakage
sensors, and infrared or thermal imaging) will take longer to implement.
Some of these advanced systems have already been installed; however, Vaughn
declined to discuss details for security reasons. Vaughn also indicated that each
of the more than 4,000 sites surveyed was unique, “So we’re going to have to
have a slightly different plan of attack for each one.” As an example, Vaughn
discussed the special security requirements of bridges built in salt-water
locations, “The salt will damage a lot of the equipment we want to put in there
to monitor. We can do it. There is some equipment out there that has been
designed for that, but it’s extremely expensive.”
The uniqueness of each site underscores, in Vaughn’s view, the need for
empowering “the folks down at the levels that are going to be dealing with
security. Let them develop the plan, let them work the plan.” (Unique local
conditions were another reason why the governor’s task force decided to assign
the vulnerability survey to regional CHP survey teams.)
Using Traffic Management Centers
Vaughn made the point that California had an advantage over other states with
respect to surface transportation security. Once sensors are installed at critical
sites, he pointed out, they can be tied into the state’s system of Traffic
Management Centers (TMC), which are manned 24/7. A motion sensor can be
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tied into video camera so that it alerts the dispatcher, i.e., a red light will go off
on “a particular screen that’s showing an image that we need to look at.”
Additional Specific Actions
According to Vaughn, the CHP has increased patrols by car, on foot, and in the
air since 9/11. Air operations have been extended from 14-15 hours per day to
24/7. (He conceded that this is costing “millions and millions” in overtime.)
Commercial vehicle inspection facilities in California also now operate 24/7,
with particular attention being given to fuel tankers or hazardous material
tankers; this is an area of particular concern to Governor Davis, who has
created a special task force on safe fuel delivery.
Vaughn reported that his task force was actively trying to “think outside the
box” to come up with security solutions for difficult cases. As an example of
out-of-the-box thinking, the task force considered parking mothballed U.S.
Navy vessels near bridge pillars to protect bridges against ramming by a
hijacked ocean vessel. “Although we’re not doing this yet in California, I
understand that New York and New Jersey may already have made these
moves or are considering it.”
Vaughn is particularly pleased with California’s existing system of
Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) among the various units of
government. “MOUs are fantastic, because they let everyone know what their
role is.” These agreements can also help develop personal relationships across
jurisdictional lines, by making sure that everyone has up-to-date, accurate
phone numbers for the people they would need to work with during an
emergency. For this to happen, he reminded participants, it is essential that
responsibility for responding, monitoring and funding be explicitly included in
these MOUs.
Projected Costs of Security Enhancements
Vaughn provided rough estimates of the projected cost of protecting
California’s surface transportation infrastructure: San Francisco-Oakland Bay
Bridge-$4.4 million; Richmond-San Rafael Bridge-$4.2 million; Antioch-$1.7
million. Projected costs in Southern California are also high. “You can see, as
we go down the list,” Vaughn noted, “that the amount needed to retrofit major
structures in Bay Area alone is $22 million. And that’s got to come out of
Caltrans’ budget.” These costs were being proposed during a year when all
state agencies have been directed to cut their budgets.
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NANCY HOUSTON: EMERGENCY TRANSPORTATION
OPERATIONS PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE WORKSHOPS
Booz Allen and Hamilton senior associate Nancy Houston framed her role on
the panel as representing Dr. Christine Johnson, head of the Operations Core
Business Unit at U.S. DOT’s Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), for
whom Booz Allen is developing and presenting a series of Emergency
Transportation Operations Preparedness and Response Workshops.
Booz Allen is currently under contract with FHWA to develop 12 interactive
two-day workshops designed to improve transportation operations during and
after an emergency. These workshops will encourage participants to emulate
best-practice responses based on real emergency situations through interactive
tabletop exercises by using lessons learned from dealing with real emergency
situations. Unlike other training programs mentioned during the summit, these
workshops would be offered to participants at no cost. Booz Allen is also
preparing a related guidebook and checklist on emergency operations
preparedness for FHWA.
Description of Project
Houston reported that the workshop project, which began on February 19,
2002, just six weeks prior to these summit presentations, was still in the very
early stages, but “moving rapidly.” She emphasized that the workshops would
be interactive because “we want people to be able to learn from one another as
well as learn from the experiences of people around the country who have had
to deal with these issues.” The workshops would be “invitation only” because
each presentation would be geared to the specific location where it would be
held, with the intention that participants would be a good cross-section of the
people in that area who would have to work together in an actual crisis.
Subject Matter Experts
Houston was proud of the quality of the subject-matter experts Booz Allen had
recruited to help develop the workshops. Team members include Sam Raines
of Booz Allen (terrorism); Rick Lane, formerly with FEMA (response and
recovery); Officer David Lubis of the Fairfax County police (law enforcement)
and Robert Stevenson, who is with Montgomery County emergency services
(fire, rescue, EMS). Additional experts include Dr. Howard Leviton, MD
(medical response to chemical/bacteriological attacks); Tony Heredia, Booz
Allen’s expert on public service wireless networks (communication); and
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Rebecca Brewster of American Trucking Association Foundation, which
operates the National Incident Management Coalition.
“State of the Practice” Assessment
Houston reported that part of Booz Allen’s assignment is to assess the “state of
the practice” (best practices) among units of government across the country as
they prepare for possible terrorist attacks. Booz Allen will evaluate response
plans for 20 jurisdictions, selected for diversity of size, location, and level of
experience in emergency response. Major states and metropolitan areas will be
included, as well as sites selected because of special conditions, such as the
presence of large chemical stockpiles. Special sites considered included
Silicon Valley and Detroit (potential for major disruption of an entire industry)
and sites near a FEMA regional headquarters (different kind of coordination
plan required) or major military installations, which may provide important
resources for response and recovery as well as be targets themselves.
Houston emphasized that Booz Allen had intentionally included team
members with top secret security clearances to facilitate obtaining emergency
response information from jurisdictions understandably reluctant to share their
plans. As Houston explained, these team members would be able to translate
classified plan specifics into generic descriptions outlining best practices in a
way that would still be useful to other jurisdictions.
Workshop Program
The workshop agenda will vary somewhat by location. One of the 12 currently
scheduled workshops will be in a rural area; another near a border crossing.
The latter was specifically requested by American Public Transportation
Association (APTA). As Houston described it, the program would emphasize
“sharing lessons learned from previous disasters,” primarily through case
studies. Some of the presenters will be veterans of actual disasters, “able to
share life experiences on a one-to-one basis.” Each day’s session will begin
with a speaker, followed by case studies and the tabletop exercise followed by
discussion and feedback. Participants will spend some of the time working in
small groups.
Tabletop exercises, Houston emphasized, “are totally different than field
exercises or on-site drills.” Everyone is gathered around a table to work
through a disaster scenario as part of a team. Each scenario will be locationspecific, and realistic, down to including referral to local points of contact
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likely to be involved in a real emergency by name. Houston mentioned that
FHWA had specifically asked her team to “build in a quarantine situation” for
one exercise, as few first responders have ever had to deal with that kind of
situation. “This is one of the reasons we have Dr. Leviton in our group,”
Houston said.
Day One will emphasize pre-incident planning and what to do during the
incident itself. Four case studies (which are being researched by the Volpe
Transportation Center) will be discussed: New York City 9/11; The Pentagon
and Washington, D.C., 9/11; the Baltimore tunnel fire; and the Northridge
earthquake. After reviewing the case studies, the group will participate in a
tabletop exercise on what to do before and during an incident. How do you get
ready? What do you need to do? What do you need to have in place before the
incident occurs? …Now it’s happened—what do you do in the first 5 minutes?
The first 5 hours? In the first 24 hours?
The first day will also focus on getting the group used to working together. As
Houston pointed out, transportation people may be accustomed to working
with the Highway Patrol, but they are not likely to know the disaster planner at
the local hospital or local FBI person. The objective here, said Houston is to
know whom we will be dealing with during a disaster, and to develop a trust
relationship with them. Another key objective is to make sure everyone is clear
about who is responsible for what during an incident.
Day Two’s tabletop focuses on recovery. The scenario tentatively selected for
the tabletop is the Northridge earthquake, precisely because there was so much
damage to the transportation system. Houston expressed her concern that most
of the current attention on recovery overemphasizes physical recovery. This
program emphasizes the role of people in restoring transit operations after an
event. “The incident has created a lot of problems for you, in terms of your
transportation infrastructure. What kind of processes do you need to have in
place,” Houston asked, “to be able to begin that recovery and continue to get
your system up and running?”
The most important part of Day Two, Houston asserted, is the “identification
and discussion of actions” that takes place toward the end of the day. While
participants will spend most of their workshop time in small groups, in this
segment the entire group is assembled to ask itself “What have we learned?
What do we need to do back in our agencies? Who is going to be responsible
for taking the next actions?” This final section is designed to motivate
participants take what they learned home and put it into action.

Mineta Transportation Institute

66

Afternoon Panel: Selected National Surface Security & Disaster Response Traning Programs

Workshop Participants
Houston stressed that the invitation list for this workshop extended beyond
“the usual transportation suspects” to include a wide range of federal and local
people: the National Guard, FBI, disaster planners from hospitals, Joint
Terrorism Task Force, military freight people, and public information staff,
“who are quite often overlooked.” She discussed her own experience of how
vital the media can be by citing what happened one 4th of July weekend during
the wildfire season when she worked at Florida DOT. The Florida Highway
Patrol called and said “Shut down I-95 from Daytona Beach to Jacksonville.”
That’s 165 miles of I-95. “So communicating with the media was absolutely
critical.” (The other unexpected communication problem she ran into that
weekend was that public calls for information and hits on the website
overloaded the system.)
Guidebook and Checklist
Houston described the guidebook and checklist as “not a cookie cutter, not the
solution to everything.” This was important, she said, to avoid producing a
document that would have to be classified, and thus not very useful. “There is a
fine line between getting you useful information and not making it too
detailed.” Instead, the guidebook would emphasize ideas planners should
consider, and point out questions they should be asking themselves and the
people they work with. She mentioned that some work had already been done
by AASHTO, primarily points emphasizing initial planning and response.
Booz Allen planned to take this work and build on it.
Other Developments
Houston then described other recent developments of possible interest to her
listeners. She mentioned that FHWA has appointed a program manager for
security and is presently in discussion with AASHTO about providing security
training for highway maintenance workers, “the people out there who are the
eyes and ears that provide information.” She also mentioned using Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS) to monitor infrastructure.
Houston gave special emphasis to security developments in freight
transportation, both rail and trucking. The air cargo project of the American
Trucking Foundation, for example, is designed to handle the chain of custody
for cargo from the manufacturer’s shipper through to the receiving air cargo
facility at the customer’s location, basically by using a Smartcard to track the
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shipment. She also mentioned a new security system based on ion-detection
technology that monitors shipments from point of inspection, through all
seaports, land border crossings and on through to the container’s final
destination. This system uses an E-Seal (a radio frequency device that signals
as it passes reader devices), displaying information indicating whether or not
the card has been tampered with. Houston also described the Asset Cargo
Tracking Project, launched led the American President Lines in cooperation
with Union Pacific Railroad, PAR government systems and Tran Centric. This
system tracks the chassis that containers ride on, anywhere in the United
States.
Finally, Houston described the “511” Traveler Information System, accessible
to the public from any telephone. While people are not used to this information
number yet, experience during the winter Olympics at Salt Lake City, where
511 was publicized, indicates that people who are desperate for information
will use 511, if they know about it. Unfortunately, phone systems, like websites
getting “zillions of hits,” can quickly become overloaded. Overloading 511 is
one issue FHWA wants to look at in order to evaluate how the Traveler
Information System could be used during an emergency.
GREG HULL: TRANSIT INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM,
BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11
The American Public Transit Association’s Director of Operations Security
and Safety, Greg Hull, described APTA as a 100-year old non-profit
association created, run, and operated for the benefit of the transit industry.
APTA is composed of 1,400 transit systems (most of the systems in North
America) plus a wide-range of business members including: planning, design
and construction firms; service providers; academic institutions; transit
associations; and departments of transportation. APTA’s activities include
public advocacy (primarily targeting government) and the promotion of
advanced technology and business opportunities—sometimes through the
establishment of partnerships with other organizations and institutions. APTA
also provides an essential forum for communication, networking, and
professional development.
Hull reviewed transit industry responses to the threat of terrorism, both before
and after 9/11. The industry had already established a terrorism coordinating
committee prior to 9/11 and had a sophisticated safety audit program,
including a security component, well underway for some time. The transit
industry also had been sharing best practices in safety and security among its
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members for a number of years, offering a significant number of training
courses dealing with specific security concerns. Following 9/11, the industry
significantly expanded all of these activities, reaching out to non-transit
agencies to coordinate disaster response planning and creating new, highlyfocused training programs and guidelines designed to help transit agencies deal
with specific security-related concerns.
APTA and the Transit Industry
Hull pointed out that one reason security is a major challenge to the transit
industry, is that “public transit is by design and nature an open infrastructure”
and therefore harder to defend. This vulnerability is compounded by the sheer
scale of an industry with 400,000 employees operating 135,000 transit vehicles
that provide some 9.5 billion passenger trips per year (2001), or about 15 times
the number of passenger trips per year provided by the airlines.
PRE 9/11 TRANSIT RESPONSES TO TERRORIST THREAT
Organizational Responses
According to Hull, America’s transit industry already had a significant number
of inter and intra-organizational committees to coordinate and share
information on security prior to 9/11, as well as offering conferences, seminars
and workshops. These efforts included a committee on public safety (COPS)
with the assignment to “directly interface” with various components of U.S.
DOT.
Training Programs
Hull highlighted several pre-9/11 training programs, including the Land
Transportation Anti-Terrorism Training Program (LTAP) offered by FLETC
(discussed earlier by Sherrie Anderson). Hull also mentioned workshops and
seminars offered at industry conferences as well as specific course offerings of
the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) in Oklahoma City, which is funded by
the federal government (including RSPA).
While financially supported by the federal government, TSI courses are jointly
developed by the industry and TSI and taught by industry-provided instructors.
These offerings are quite specific to transportation security: Transit System
Security; Transit Explosives Incident Management; Threat Management in
Response to Bus Hijacking; Responses to Weapons of Mass Destruction;

Mineta Transportation Institute

Afternoon Panel: Selected National Surface Security & Disaster Response Traning Programs

69

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design; Threat Management and
Emergency Response to Rail Hijacking. All were available pre-9/11.
Safety Audits
According to Hull, transit system safety audits have been available to rail
transit systems since the mid-1980s. When the industry requested APTA to
recommend a common standard for system safety, APTA responded by
modifying military standard 882C (originally developed for use by state
governments), simplifying the military standard and adding best practices in
use by the private sector. The result was the Rail Safety Audit Program, which
measures 24 specific factors. Hull reminded his audience that “What gets
measured gets done.” The rail safety audit program has two components: (1) to
be approved, a newly developed audit program must address all 24 factors; and
(2), once approved, the new system must be subject to audit. At least four of
the 24 audit factors are directly concerned with security: security, training,
emergency response planning, and preparedness.
The rail transit audit program was voluntary when it began in the 1980s.
However, in 1995 the Federal Transit Administration made compliance
mandatory. From that time forward, all rail transit systems have been required
to implement a system safety program conforming to APTA guidelines.
The nation’s 19 commuter railroads now employ a similar audit program
developed by APTA in cooperation with the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA). However, the commuter rail audit program (which has increased the
number of audit factors from 24 to 29) is still voluntary, as is APTA’s
adaptation of the same basic audit framework for use by the bus industry.
Twenty-eight bus systems across the country now conduct these audits,
including 8 in California. Hull reminded his audience that bus operations
constitute 64 percent of the U.S. transit industry.
Hull believes the bus audit program will remain voluntary; however, he noted
that FTA and National Transportation Safety Board continue to press for a
more uniform national standard for bus safety. He expects FTA to urge all bus
operations to develop a system safety plan covering six basic areas: “how you
train; how you maintain; how you deal with accidents; how you manage your
drug and alcohol program; and—guess what—security.” Hull reported that
APTA, along with AASHTO and the Community Transportation Association
of America (CTAA), is now collaborating with FTA to encourage participation
in this voluntary program.

Mineta Transportation Institute

70

Afternoon Panel: Selected National Surface Security & Disaster Response Traning Programs

The FTA has continued its pre-9/11 policy of providing security audits upon
request, Hull said. “Quite a number of transit systems took advantage of that,
and these audits are still available.” Hull also pledged APTA’s support to his
summit listeners, offering APTA-organized peer reviews to help their transit
agencies evaluate specific problems or incidents, including those involving
security. Hull stated that, “We gather people who are subject matter experts in
the industry, and they will come out to your property.”
Hull feels that the safety audit program strongly supports another pre-9/11
transit industry effort that can bolster security, the sharing of best practices.
“Because of our involvement with audit programs we are able to look at all
aspects of transit agencies, both commuter rail and bus…and advise [agencies]
as to what seems to be working well throughout the industry.” Hull announced
the launch of a secure FTA website that will share transit security best practices
identified by the audit program.
Resource Materials
In addition to sharing best practices, Hull informed his listeners that APTA’s
website also has a safety and security forum, which operates a list serve
function allowing web users to forward their safety and security questions to
other transit industry sites. “If you are wondering if someone has a program,
you can pose your question to the industry. If you have an incident, and wonder
if anyone else has had something like this (and how they dealt with it) you can
pose your query to the industry.”
APTA also provides other resources, including a CD-ROM on emergency
response plans that was developed prior to 9/11. For security reasons, this CD
contains only generic information, “but it gives you a good basis on which to
build an emergency response plan that covers bus, rail, and commuter rail.”
Hull also mentioned that APTA is working closely with FTA and the Volpe
Center to develop security plan guidelines. These guidelines are available
through the FTA’s website.
POST 9/11 TRANSIT INDUSTRY RESPONSE
Request for Federal Support
APTA’s first action after 9/11, said Hull, was to meet with FTA and FRA to
convey “what we felt were the immediate needs of the industry,” in terms of
capital, operating and R&D expenses. These requests were also shared with
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Congress. The total estimated cost for these additional security investments,
according to Hull, was $6 billion.
Industry Meetings
APTA’s 2001 annual meeting was held as scheduled at the end of September in
Philadelphia, just weeks after 9/11. Over 600 people at the meeting attended a
major forum entitled Under Attack, Transit Responds. (This presentation is
accessible on APTA’s website.) Hull also reminded his audience that APTA had
partnered with RSPA and AASHTO to support the Mineta Transportation
Institute’s October 30, 2001 symposium on transportation security, which
became a model for the current California summit.
Security Task Force
APTA responded organizationally to 9/11 by creating an executive committee
security task force to provide strategic direction and avoid duplication of
effort. “We wanted,” said Hull, “to reach out to other associations and other
partners.” Additional partners mentioned by Hull include the U.S. Conference
of Mayors and the National Association of Counties. Hull also reported that
APTA planned to work with international transportation associations during
the summer of 2002 to create a new forum for exchanging information and
collaborating on programs.
TCRP Research
Hull indicated that the Transportation Research Board (TRB) had allocated
some $2 million specifically for security-related research via the Transit
Cooperative Research Program (TCRP). The new executive committee
security task force will provide oversight and, via the work of two subcommittees (in coordination with TRB), help identify appropriate projects.
The first TCRP project to be approved was a $300,000 program for two-day
security workshops targeting CEOs and senior security executives of transit
agencies. Three of the four planned workshops were to focus on rail transit; the
fourth targeted bus operations. To add realism, transit terrorism experts from
London Transport and Tel Aviv were invited to share their knowledge and
experience.
The workshop relies heavily on “what if” scenarios, inviting the attending
CEOs and heads of security to “put on bad-guy hats” to help identify major
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vulnerabilities in specific tactical situations. Participants then switch to “goodguy hats” and suggest how to respond to the vulnerabilities they have just
identified. The plan, Hull said, was to complete the workshop series by May
2002, and then publish a written document (edited for security reasons)
reflecting the collective wisdom of participants to share with transit agency
leaders unable to attend the live sessions.
Transit Safety Planning Guide
Another project “underway right now,” said Hull, was an update of the Transit
Safety Security Program Planning Guide and Security Handbook. This update
will focus on “lessons learned” from 9/11 with respect to security-related
training and communications, not just in New York and Washington, DC, but
in all the other cities affected by 9/11, including those that had to deal with
“white powder scares.” At the request of transit agencies “both large and
small,” APTA has also developed a generic checklist for emergency response
planning. This simple, two-page checklist is based on industry best practices
and can be accessed on APTA’s website.
Communications Training Guidelines
An APTA review of lessons learned on 9/11, particularly with respect to
anthrax scares and other biochemical issues (primarily hoaxes), concluded that
transit agencies need better information on how to manage communications
with customers during an emergency. “The industry,” he said, “would respond
by developing guidelines for staff communications training.”
Intrusion Detection for Transportation Facilities
Hull indicated that a number of transit agencies were putting advanced
intrusion detection technology in place, but that results so far were mixed. He
feels the industry needs to evaluate “what is out there right now for intrusion
detection and what’s working.” A related research concern, he said, was
determining whether portable explosive detection devices (which exist right
now) are effective. Hull also mentioned exploring the possible use of dogs for
explosives detection in the transit environment.
Emergency Response Mobilization Guidelines
Hull announced that “one of the major projects that we are undertaking” is the
development of Emergency Response Mobilization Guidelines for transit. One
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issue the guidelines will address is the role of transit in evacuation with respect
to other agencies. “We need to look at evacuation not just as a transit entity, but
at how we work with all our partners and stakeholders—all the first
responders,” including, he added, the Office of Emergency Management and
FEMA.
Communicating “Soft” Threats
Hull believes that transit agencies need to create a new mechanism for sharing
“soft” information regarding security threats with other agencies, including the
FTA, the Transportation Security Agency and Homeland Security. It is
important, he asserted, not just to share hard information regarding a major
security threat or incident, but also the collective wisdom of experienced
transit employees with respect to their intuitive sense of what’s going on, or
subtle trends they may have picked up. In order to benefit from this kind of
input, FTA and other agencies need a mechanism that plugs directly into
DOT’s Transportation Information Operations Center.
OTHER RECENT PROJECTS
Vulnerability Assessments
In the final segment of his presentation, Hull described other post 9/11
government responses to the terrorist threat, primarily those undertaken by
FTA’s Office of Safety and Security. This office is currently conducting
vulnerability assessments to identify major security gaps underway for 32
transit agencies. Assessment results for specific agencies will remain
confidential. However, FTA will use the aggregated results to identify general
areas where additional federal support may be needed.
Chemical and Bio Agent Guidelines
FTA has recently developed specific guidelines for dealing with chemical and
biological agents in transit and transit tunnel environments. These guidelines
were developed in collaboration with industry and have been sent to all rail
transit agencies. Hull suggested that some of these guidelines might be
transferable to highway environments. However, this is a security-controlled
FTA document, and Hull suggested that those who believe they need access
should make a direct request to FTA.
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Emergency Preparedness Workshops
Hull described 15 regional emergency preparedness workshops, scheduled to
begin in May 2002, that target mid-size and smaller agencies and firstresponders that work with these agencies. These workshops were specifically
intended, Hull said, to provide smaller agencies with training at a level
comparable to that already available to larger cities.
Emergency Preparedness Drills
Just a few weeks prior to this summit, the FTA Office of Safety and Security
announced that funding and technical support for preparedness drills would be
made available to state and local agencies on a request basis. This support,
Hull observed, was based on FTA’s recognition that “Drills cost money. They
cost money to pay people for overtime and to get the equipment out there.”
Need for Better Links between Transit Industry and Government
Hull believes that it is essential for the transit industry to develop better links
with FTA, TSA, and Homeland Security. As an example of the need, he cited
the apparent confusion surrounding Homeland Security’s “Threat Advisory”
announcements.” What do the various threat levels specifically mean to transit
agencies? To help clear up this confusion, Hull said that APTA is “working
with FTA and TSA right now” to find out how to apply each threat level to
transit operations and to other modes of transportation. Hull also reminded his
listeners of the need to lobby Washington for additional security support—as
well as technical and training support—in the next reauthorization of TEA-21.
Clearinghouse for Security Technology
Hull spoke about the need to create some kind of clearinghouse to help sort
through the barrage of marketing material promoting new security technology.
Hull acknowledged his own difficulty in evaluating competing claims,
admitting, “I don’t know what’s really good.” Recent meetings between APTA
and Homeland Security indicated that many other agencies and organizations
are having similar difficulties. One possible resource for advice regarding new
technology, Hull advised his listeners, is the Technical Support Working Group
(TSWG) at the Department of Defense, whose mission is to coordinate
research to combat terrorism.
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As his final point, Hull repeated, “what we have heard so often here,” the need
to “drill, drill, drill.”
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SUMMARIZED QUESTIONS & ANSWERS FOR
AFTERNOON PANELS
OAKLAND SUMMIT SESSION, MARCH 28, 2002
WARREN WEBER, CALIFORNIA DOT
What is the panel’s reaction to an American Association of Railroads (AAR)
proposal to foil would-be terrorists by removing railcar logos that identify
hazardous contents, such as chlorine or sulfuric acid?
GREG HULL
The consensus at a recent transit industry meeting (which AAR attended) is
that this proposal is impractical because it would place first responders in peril;
they would not know what hazards they were dealing with; this proposal will
therefore not move forward. However “less visible” means of identifying
hazardous materials (such as bar codes) should be explored.
CATHERINE SHOWALTER
More public involvement could mitigate the threat of complacency cited by
several speakers. How do we get the word out to the public as to how they can
get involved?
STEVE HEMINGER
Use every medium available: Play taped messages on the telephone while
callers to your agency are on hold; use billboards; ask association magazines to
run your messages; and advertise on your websites.
SHERRIE ANDERSON
Coordination across an entire region is not only possible, it can make a
difference. Transcom, a greater NY area group of transportation professionals,
helped facilitate transportation operations throughout the Northeast on 9/11.
Group members relayed the latest traffic flow information from the Emergency
Operations Center in NYC to their own transportation organizations and others
as far north as Maine and as far south as Delaware.
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STEVE HEMINGER
Most major transit systems already use public address announcements to enroll
passengers as additional “eyes and ears” to report suspicious packages. The
web is another key resource. Public web inquiries to New York City Transit hit
1 million per day immediately after 9/11 and have continued at a high level.
NANCY OKASAKI, MTC
MTC has a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with major transit
operators in the Bay Area, including Caltrans (as well as CHP) to support
California’s state Office of Emergency Services’ role as a public information
clearinghouse during earthquakes. This MOU could also apply to terrorist
attacks as well; I invite you to contact me for more information.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT
If community groups were willing to invite speakers, would CHP or other
agencies be willing to come?
STEVE HEMINGER
Absolutely. Speaking at public forums is a command responsibility of your
CHP area commanders; they welcome requests. I encourage your organization
to contact your local CHP.

LOS ANGELES SUMMIT SESSION, MARCH 29, 2002
HERB COKA, FTA METRO OFFICE LOS ANGELES
(to Nancy Houston) You said that only one FHWA-sponsored emergency
preparedness workshop focusing on ports of entry is currently funded. I hope
you will add more because the issues at various ports of entry vary
considerably.
NANCY HOUSTON
I agree. We are attempting to get additional funding because the demand is
great. We are also trying to ensure as much geographic coverage as possible.
FHWA is coordinating with FTA to make sure that our respective workshops
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are held in different locations. The president has also committed to a more
open U.S.-Mexican border, so federal motor carrier safety people are also
planning additional activities.
UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT
Two other DOT agencies very much involved with ports and border crossings,
are the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration, which have recently
launched a port security program, initially funded at $90 million. Also, the
president’s commitment to opening up the U.S.-Mexican border has clearly put
a burden on DOT’s motor carrier administration to expand its border programs.
DARREN WANG, CALIFORNIA DOT
After hearing today’s presentation, I have a question: How secure do we want
to be? How much do we want to spend in terms of security?
SHERRIE ANDERSON
We want a secure system, yet we do not want to impair mobility. We want
potential terrorists to perceive that something is being done; yet we know that
regardless of how much we spend there is no absolutely secure system that
“will prevent a bad guy from getting into your system.” We are not trying to
create a “Fort Knox” in the transportation arena, but we have to do something
in order to protect the system.
GREG HULL
We could make our system 100 percent safe, but if we do, nothing is going to
move. People will not be transported. Today we are moving 9.5 billion
passengers a year. A certain level of risk exposure is unavoidable. The
challenge, I believe, is to be able to demonstrate diligence.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
511 system

Traveler Information System

AAR

Association of American Railroads

AASHTO

American Association
Transportation Officials

ABAG

Association of Bay Area Governments

Al-Qaida

Established by Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s to
bring together Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against
the Soviet invasion. Helped finance, recruit, transport
and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan
resistance

APTA

American Public Transportation Association

BATWING

Bay Area Terrorism Working Group

Caltrans

California Department of Transportation

CCTV

Closed Circuit TV

CHP

California Highway Patrol

CMC

Crisis Management Center

COPS

Committee on Public Safety

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CPUC

California Public Utilities Commission

CTAA

Community Transportation Association of America

DAG

Direct Action Group

DOD

Department of Defense

DOT

Department of Transportation

EOC

Emergency Operations Center

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

HazMat

Hazardous Materials
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State

Highway
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

FLETC

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

ICS

Incident Command System

ITS

Intelligent Transportation Systems

LTAP

Federal Law Enforcement Training Program

MOU

Memorandum of Understanding

NISC

National Infrastructure Security Committee

NY-MTA

New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority

PATH

Port Authority Trans Hudson Rail System

PIO

Public Information Officer

RSPA

Research and Special Programs Administration

SARIN

Colorless, odorless gas that is 20 times more lethal than
potassium cyanide

SEMS

Standardized Emergency Management System

STRAHNET

Strategic Highway Network

TSA

Transportation Security Agency

TSI

Transportation Safety Institute

TSWG

Technical Support Working Group

USAR

Urban Search and Rescue

WMATA

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Mineta Transportation Institute

